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CAREMARK AND ESG, PERFECT TOGETHER: 
 
A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO IMPLEMENTING AN INTEGRATED, EFFICIENT, 
AND EFFECTIVE CAREMARK AND EESG STRATEGY 
 
By 
 
Leo E. Strine, Jr.,* Kirby M. Smith,** and Reilly S. Steel*** 
 
With increased calls from investors, legislators, and academics for corporations to 
consider employee, environmental, social, and governance factors (“EESG”) when making 
decisions, boards and managers are struggling to situate EESG within their existing reporting 
and organizational structures.  Building on an emerging literature connecting EESG with 
corporate compliance, this Essay argues that EESG is best understood as an extension of the 
board’s duty to implement and monitor a compliance program under Caremark.  If a company 
decides to do more than the legal minimum, it will simultaneously satisfy legitimate demands for 
strong EESG programs and promote compliance with the law.  Building on that insight, we 
explain how boards can marry existing corporate compliance programs with budding EESG 
programs.  By integrating compliance and EESG, corporations can meet growing societal 
demands in an effective and efficient manner that capitalizes on existing structures.  Lastly, we 
address how EESG and corporate compliance responsibilities should be allocated at the board 
and senior management level.  Instead of separating compliance and EESG oversight, this Essay 
suggests that boards embrace a functional approach, delegating similar compliance and EESG 
oversight to the same committee and managers.  By situating EESG within the board’s existing 
fiduciary duties, this Essay provides academics, legislators, investors, and managers with a 
novel framework to conceptualize EESG while also offering a path forward for boards 
struggling to place the current EESG movement within their existing corporate structure. 
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Introduction 
With concerns about climate change, growing economic insecurity and inequality, and a 
growing sense that some entities and industry sectors have grown so large, concentrated and 
powerful that they have the potential to endanger our lives and the resiliency of our critical 
supply chains1 has come renewed concern about whether business entities conduct themselves in 
a manner that is consistent with society’s best interests.  The profound human and economic 
harm caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, and its harmful effects on ordinary workers, will only 
deepen societal focus about whether our corporate governance system is working well for the 
many or instead subordinating the interests of employees and society to please the stock market.  
This concern has many manifestations, but a central one is a demand that corporations, and the 
institutional investors who control the bulk of their stock, respect the best interests of society and 
all corporate stakeholders, not solely stockholders.2  The buzz abbreviation for this is 
”environmental, social, and governance” (ESG), or as one of us has called it, “EESG.”3   
For corporate directors and managers, this demand is a mixed blessing.  Fortunately, 
many corporate fiduciaries believe that companies are most likely to create sustainable profits if 
they in fact act fairly toward their employees, customers, creditors, the environment, and the 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., Jill E. Hobbs, Food Supply Chains During the COVID-19 Pandemic, CANADIAN J. AGR. ECON., May 
2020, at 3 (observing “[f]ood supply chains dominated by a few large concentrated processors (e.g., meat packing) 
may be particularly vulnerable” to supply chain disruptions during the COVID-19 pandemic); Sue Reisenger, 
Beyond Antitrust, US Justice Department Expands Its Review Into Big Tech Companies, LAW.COM (Nov. 18, 2019), 
https://www.law.com/corpcounsel/2019/11/18/beyond-antitrust-us-justice-department-expands-its-review-into-big-
tech-companies/?slreturn=20200431215134# (noting DOJ may investigate large technology companies’ handling of 
consumer data). 
2 See infra [●]. 
3 The extra “E” for employees—a crucial but oftentimes missing component in the ESG discussion.  See Leo E. 
Strine, Jr., Towards Fair and Sustainable Capitalism:  A Comprehensive Proposal to Help American Workers, 
Restore Fair Gainsharing Between Employees and Shareholders, and Increase American Competitiveness by 
Reorienting Our Corporate Governance System Towards Sustainable Long-Term Growth and Encouraging 
Investment in America’s Future (U. Pa. Inst. for Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 1939, 2019), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3461924. 
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communities the company’s operations affect.4  More cynically, corporate fiduciaries fear that 
this is another “of the moment” movement that will simply pile additional checklist items on top 
of the already-extensive list of duties imposed on them over the past several decades.  Boards 
and management teams are struggling to situate EESG within their existing reporting and 
committee framework and figure out how to meet the demand for greater accountability to 
society while not falling short in other areas.  
In this Essay, we propose a way of thinking about EESG that might be helpful to 
directors and senior managers seeking to efficiently and effectively create a corporate culture and 
policies that promote ethical, fair, and sustainable behavior without simply heaping additional 
hours and work on already-stretched employees and directors.  To develop the framework for 
this proposal, we explain the relationship of the supposedly novel and enhanced concept of 
EESG to the pre-existing duty of corporations and their directors to implement and monitor 
compliance programs to ensure that the company honors its legal obligations.  This longstanding 
duty, associated with the Delaware Court of Chancery’s landmark decision in In re Caremark 
International Inc. Derivative Litigation5 but rooted in the much older requirement that 
corporations conduct only lawful business by lawful means, overlaps with and should be 
integrated into companies’ decisions to hold themselves to even higher levels of responsibility.   
Understanding and acting on the need to merge EESG and corporate compliance will 
improve the ability of corporations to do this important work with less stress but more impact.  If 
a company decides to do more than the legal minimum toward its employees, its consumers, the 
environment, and society as a whole, and implements strong EESG policies and standards to 
hold itself accountable to those objectives, it will simultaneously satisfy legitimate demands for 
                                                 
4 See infra [●]. 
5 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
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strong EESG programs and promote compliance with law.  By aiming to be better than 
necessary, you should at least do what is required. 
Building on this framework, we also give some suggestions about how directors and 
managers can implement an integrated compliance and EESG policy efficiently and effectively.  
Most importantly, we focus on the need to ensure that relevant issues are allocated in a sensible 
way not only at the management level, which ensures that the appropriate expertise and 
judgment is brought to bear on the risks companies face and pose to their stakeholders, but also 
that corresponding reporting and accountability structures exist at the board level.  Without a 
sensible allocation of responsibility and the recognition that diverse expertise is needed to 
effectively address diverse risks, companies hazard missing key warning signals and failing to 
turn lofty goals for responsible behavior into effective action. 
In showing the natural relationship of EESG with the longstanding duty to comply with 
the law, we build on a nascent literature that has begun to connect EESG and corporate 
compliance.6  For example, in recent work, Stavros Gadinis and Amelia Miazad champion 
greater corporate focus on “sustainability” as more promising than mere compliance and propose 
modifying directors’ fiduciary duties to include ESG considerations.7  We agree that a greater 
focus on sustainability and respect for stakeholders is socially useful, but instead of adding a new 
component to the traditional fiduciary duties of loyalty and care, we situate EESG within the 
established legal regime and propose a way for boards to address the demands of EESG and 
compliance in integrated, efficient, and effective way. 
                                                 
6 For an incisive review of this literature, see Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate Social Responsibility, ESG, and 
Compliance, in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF COMPLIANCE (D. Daniel Sokol & Benjamin van Rooij eds., 
forthcoming), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3479723. 
7 Stavros Gadinis & Amelia Miazad, Corporate Law and Social Risk, VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3441375.  Oher recent work similarly proposes expanding 
directors’ fiduciary duties on the premise they currently do not sufficiently penalize compliance failures.  See John 
Armour, Jeffrey Gordon & Geeyoung Min, Taking Compliance Seriously, 37 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (2020). 
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This Essay proceeds in three parts.  Starting with a brief overview of the contemporary 
debates regarding stakeholders and EESG, Part I observes that the first principle of corporate law 
is that a corporation must conduct lawful business by lawful means.  From this first principle, the 
Essay then situates today’s focus on EESG as an extension of the principle that corporations 
must act in accordance with the legitimate expectations of society for lawful and ethical conduct.  
In particular, the Essay explains, as a matter of practical business strategy, the reality is that if a 
company strives to be an above-average corporate citizen, then it will also be much more likely 
to simultaneously meet its minimum legal and regulatory duties.  In this way, EESG and 
ordinary compliance should be seen as interconnected and be accomplished in an integrated one-
step process.  Based on this observation, Part II sketches a high-level framework that allows 
directors and managers to situate EESG initiatives within their existing compliance and 
regulatory program.  Finally, Part III ends with practical advice for how directors and managers 
can implement EESG initiatives by integrating it into their existing compliance and regulatory 
programs.  By engaging in a thoughtful updating and integration of existing regulatory reporting 
and compliance and EESG processes, corporate leaders can efficiently generate robust 
information about their EESG performance, provide corporate stakeholders with good 
information about the company’s legal compliance and EESG efforts, and simultaneously fulfill 
their duty to monitor the corporate enterprise.  Put simply, by more coherently using the 
considerable corporate resources already devoted to compliance and EESG, corporations can 
meet the demand for improved corporate citizenship in a cost-effective manner that does not add 
undue burdens to their employees, top managers, or directors. 
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I. The Origins of Today’s Intense Focus on EESG 
In the last two generations, the prevailing view among many business leaders, 
institutional investors, and law and economics academics was that corporate law should 
primarily serve the interests of companies’ stockholders, an ideology that has come to be known 
as “shareholder primacy.”8  This shareholder-focused school had gained ascendancy over another 
traditional school of corporate law thinking—which was widely held in the era from the New 
Deal until the Reagan Administration began—that saw the firm as a social institution that should 
not just seek profit for stockholders, but treat society and other corporate stakeholders like 
workers with respect.9  In fact, just two decades ago, two eminent scholars called this “the end of 
history for corporate law.”10  That is, the consensus that corporations should focus on 
shareholders’ best interests was supposedly so widespread and so obviously correct that all other 
ideologies, including the purportedly discredited “stakeholderism,” were now dead letters.11 
                                                 
8 E.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO L.J. 439, [●] (2000).  
We are simplifying a complex issue.  In short form, shareholder primacy involves the view that corporations should, 
within the limits allowed by law and ethics, focus on the best interests of their stockholders.   This is exemplified by 
Milton Friedman’s famous New York Times op-ed, Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to 
Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES, at SM-12, Sept. 13, 1970, and was well summarized by Chancellor Allen in his 
excellent article, William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 14 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 261 (1992).  The basic idea is that because stockholders supposedly only gain after all the corporation’s other 
stakeholders have their legal claims satisfied, a focus in corporate law on maximizing gains to stockholders will 
produce the most social wealth.  One of us has argued at length elsewhere that there are many problems with this 
simplistic concept.  Leo E. Strine, Jr., Corporate Power Is Corporate Purpose I: Evidence from My Hometown, 33 
OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 176 (2017); Leo E. Strine Jr., Corporate Power is Corporate Purpose II: An 
Encouragement for Future Consideration from Professors Johnson and Millon, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1165 
(2017).  See also sources cited infra note [●] (critiquing the shareholder primacy ideology). 
9 Chancellor, later Professor, Allen summarized the historical tension between these two schools of thinking in 
Allen, supra note [●].  It is notable that this shift to shareholder primacy coincided with the Reagan- and Bush-era 
deregulatory shift.  Shareholder primacy arguably makes more sense when there are legal and regulatory mandates 
“with teeth” in place, provided that shareholder primacy is understood to include an overriding obligation to operate 
within the law, as even Friedman understood it.  See Friedman, supra note [●]. 
10 Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note [●], at [●]. 
11 This scholarly overstatement, of course, ignored or discounted that in many of the leading economies of the 
OECD, such as Germany and the Netherlands, the corporate law took a more stakeholder-oriented approach, 
LENORE PALLADINO & KRISTINA KARLSSON, TOWARDS ‘ACCOUNTABLE CAPITALISM: REMAKING CORPORATE LAW 
THROUGH STAKEHOLDER GOVERNANCE 11 (2018), http://rooseveltinstitute.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/10/Towards-%E2%80%98Accountable-Capitalism%E2%80%99-issue-brief.pdf (“In other 
advanced industrialized economies, balanced models of corporate governance are the norm. In two-thirds of Europe, 
workers have a role on the corporate board, and in 13 countries, including Germany and France, worker governance 
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Just as the rise of nationalist movements around the world suggests that it may have been 
premature to announce that liberal democracy reflects “the end of history” for government,12 the 
need for a series of high-profile corporate bailouts, wage stagnation, rising inequality and 
economic insecurity, and the resulting political and social consequences have put pressure on the 
shareholder primacy concept.  Likely as a response to these societal concerns, many business 
leaders, institutional investors, and policymakers have again gravitated toward the view that 
corporations should serve the interests of all their stakeholders, not just those who own the 
company’s stock.  For example, in August 2019, the Business Roundtable—an influential 
organization comprised of the CEOs of the biggest American public companies—changed its 
existing statement on the purpose of a corporation—which had been updated in 1997, when 
shareholder primacy was the vogue—to commit to serving all stakeholders, and not just 
stockholders.13  Facing their own political pressures as a result of their growing power and their 
stewardship over working people’s savings, a number of institutional investors—three of whom 
“hold so many shares in America’s public companies that they each control one of the five 
largest stakes in 24 of the 25 largest U.S. corporations”14—have publicly stated that the creation 
                                                 
rights are extensive across much of the private sector.”), and that a majority of American states had adopted so-
called constituency statutes permitting boards to treat stakeholder interests with respect, Carline Flammer & 
Aleksandra Kacperczyk, The Impact of Stakeholder Orientation on Innovation: Evidence from a Natural 
Experiment, 62 MGMT. SCI. 1982 (2015) (analyzing the effect of the enactment of constituency statutes in 34 states 
between 1984 and 2006). 
12 In The End of History and the Last Man, political scientist Francis Fukuyama famously argued that Western 
liberal democracy had become “the final form of human government.”  FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY 
AND THE LAST MAN [●] (1992). 
13 Business Roundtable, Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation, https://opportunity.businessroundtable.org/wp-
content/uploads/2020/03/BRT-Statement-on-the-Purpose-of-a-Corporation-with-Signatures.pdf.  This change 
brought the Roundtable’s view back in line with those it first took on corporate governance in 1978, when it first 
spoke on the subject, and reversed the move toward stockholder primacy it made in its 1997 statement.  See 
Business Roundtable, The Role and Composition of the Board of Directors of the Large Publicly Owned 
Corporation (1978); Business Roundtable, Statement on Corporate Responsibility (1981).  See also Martin Lipton et 
al., The New Paradigm:  A Roadmap for an Implicit Corporate Governance Partnership Between Corporation and 
Investors to Achieve Sustainable Long-Term Investment and Growth, World Econ. F. (Sept. 2, 2016). 
14 John Morley, Too Big to Be Activist, 107 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3225555 (manuscript at 2). 
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of sustainable corporate profits requires companies to act fairly towards their stakeholders.15  
Meanwhile, some politicians have called for radical overhauls of the legal regime governing 
directors’ fiduciary duties such that boards would be legally required to consider all 
stakeholders’ interests.16  And a number of academics have joined the fray as well.17   
The economic and human crisis caused by COVID-19 will only turn the volume up on calls for 
greater corporate regard for stakeholders like workers, ordinary-course suppliers, and the 
communities in which companies operate.  After a ten-year economic recovery resulting in 
substantial measure from a government rescue of the financial sector and a substantial cut of the 
corporate tax rate from 35% to 21%, one might have expected many corporations to have been 
well positioned to have balance sheets with prudent reserves that enabled them to weather some 
period of months without revenues without immediately laying off workers and failing to pay 
their landlords and ordinary suppliers.  But a large number of corporations had failed to build up 
                                                 
15 See Larry Fink, A Sense of Purpose: Larry Fink’s 2018 Letter to CEOs, BLACKROCK, 
https://www.BlackRock.com/corporate/investor-relations/2018-larry-fink-ceo-letter (“To prosper over time, every 
company must not only deliver financial performance, but also show how it makes a positive contribution to 
society.”); John C. Bogle, Bogle Sounds a Warning on Index Funds, Wall St. J. (Nov. 29, 2018); Proxy Voting and 
Engagement Guidelines, North America (United States and Canada), STATE STREET GLOBAL ADVISERS 8 
(Mar. 2018), https://web.archive.org/web/20180723160412/https://www.ssga.com/investmenttopics/environmental-
social-governance/2018/03/Proxy-Voting-and-Engagement-GuidelinesNA-20180301.pdf. (“Well-developed 
environmental and social management systems . . . generate efficiencies and enhance productivity, both of which 
impact shareholder value in the long-term.”); Policies and Guidelines Environmental and Social Matters, 
VANGUARD (2018), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20190220221801/https://about.vanguard.com/investmentstewardship/policies-and-
guidelines/ (“[W]e believe our approach strikes the appropriate balance between corporate responsibility and our 
fiduciary obligations.  For a critique that institutional investors need to incorporate these statements into their proxy-
voting practices, see Leo E. Strine, Jr., Fiduciary Blind Spot: The Failure of Institutional Investors to Prevent the 
Illegitimate Use of Working Americans’ Savings for Corporate Political Spending, 97 Wash U. L. Rev. 
(forthcoming 2020). 
16 See S. 3348, Accountable Capitalism Act, § 5, 115th Cong. (2018); Corporate Accountability and Democracy, 
Bernie, https://berniesanders.com/issues/corporate-accountability-and-democracy (last visited Mar. 29, 2020). 
17 See COLIN MAYER, PROSPERITY: BETTER BUSINESS MAKES THE GREATER GOOD (2019); LYNN STOUT, THE 
SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH (2012).  Relatedly, academics have also paid significant attention to the rise of 
“passive” institutional investors, who have often supported ESG reforms.  See Jill Fisch, Assaf Hamdani & Steven 
Davidoff Solomon, The New Titans of Wall Street:  A Theoretical Framework for Passive Investors, 168 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 17 (2019); Dorothy Lund Shapiro, The Case Against Passive shareholder Voting, 43 J. CORP. L. 101 (2018); 
Lucian A. Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Index Funds and the Future of Corporate Governance: Theory, Evidence, and 
Policy, 199 COLUM. L. REV. 2029 (2019). 
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those reserves, having used all their excess cash on stock buybacks and dividends, and thus 
having no cushion against a serious downturn.  Even more importantly, the differential effects of 
the pandemic on workers has heightened existing concerns about economic inequality.  Not only 
did millions of low-wage American workers lose their jobs, but the fact that their jobs had failed 
to pay a living wage left them with no safety margin to weather the sudden loss of a job.  And 
those workers who were considered so “essential” to the ongoing functioning of society that they 
were required to continue working and putting themselves at greater risk of exposure during the 
pandemic turned out to make much less on average than most Americans.18  The pandemic also 
underscored the persistence of profound racial inequality in our economy, as Black workers who 
kept their jobs were more likely to be in risky, low-wage jobs as essential workers, and Black 
workers overall were more likely to lose employment and were less wealthy and less well 
positioned to weather the storm.  And bringing together the interrelated nature of what EESG 
involves, these workers bore the human costs of illness and even death, as the requirement to 
work in a food processing plant, a shipping facility, or a hospital exposed them to greater risk, 
and the failure of some of these companies to be able to keep their workers safe led them to have 
to engage in shutdowns, which further endangered not just their workers’ continued employment, 
but the companies’ ability to deliver its products and services and to make money.19  In the wake 
of the pandemic, it is likely that public officials, regulators, and private plaintiffs will all take 
                                                 
18 Kylie McQuarrie, The Average Salary of Essential Workers, 
https://www.business.org/finance/accounting/average-salary-of-essential-workers/ (reporting that “the average 
salary for essential workers is far below the state’s average”); see also Susan Lund et al., Lives and Livelihoods: 
Assessing the Near-Term Impact of COVID-19 on US Workers (McKinsey, Apr. 2020) (finding that 86% of 
vulnerable jobs—that is jobs that could be lost, cut, or furloughed because of the COVID-19 pandemic—paid less 
than $40,000 per year).   
19 See Sarah Thomason & Annette Bernhardt, Front-line Essential Jobs in California: A Profile of Job and Worker 
Characteristics, UC Berkeley Labor Center May 14, 2020), http://laborcenter.berkeley.edu/front-line-essential-jobs-
in-california-a-profile-of-job-and-worker-characteristics (finding Latinx and Black workers were most likely to be 
“employed in front-line essential jobs”). 
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steps to hold corporate America accountable for some of the harm suffered by stakeholders like 
workers during the crisis, and that many of them will call on corporations to deepen their 
commitment to good compliance and EESG practices.20 
For all these reasons, regardless of whether stakeholder interests are framed as an end in 
themselves or are considered merely “instrumental” in the pursuit of shareholder value,21 the 
demand for increased attention to stakeholders is clear.  At the same time, shareholder primacy is 
by no means without its defenders, with some scholars, business leaders, institutional investors, 
and other commentators continuing to advance views associated with shareholder primacy.22 
But in this debate about whether for-profit corporate boards must put stockholder welfare 
first, or may (or must) govern in the best interests of all the corporation’s key stakeholders, is too 
often lost a first principle of corporate law.  This first principle adds at least one important caveat 
to the notion that corporate law makes “stockholder wealth maximization” (or even “stockholder 
welfare maximization”)23 the fundamental end of corporate law.   
That first principle is a simple one, but too often ignored, and it is relevant to today’s 
debate and the growing societal concern about whether corporations and other business entities 
                                                 
20 Indeed, some of these groups have already begun to demand greater accountability.  See, e.g., Paycheck Security 
Act, [https://www.warner.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/pressreleases?id=384799E4-5040-4671-80E8-
A87A26FB6C7E] (proposing to amend the CARES Act so that companies receiving bailout funds are prohibited 
from buyback stock, must stay neutral during union organizing efforts and cap CEO pay at 50 times the median 
wage of the company’s workforce); H.R. 6989, Pandemic Anti-Monopoly Act 116th Cong. (2020) (proposing a 
moratorium on mergers until after the FTC determines that workers, consumers and other stakeholders are no longer 
in severe financial distress); Andrew Cuomo, Let’s Not Repeat the Mistake of Putting Corporations Ahead of 
Workers in a Crisis, Washington Post (May 13, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/05/13/andrew-cuomo-what-washington-must-do-protect-workers/ 
(advocating for “[c]orporations that [receive federal bailout money] must hire back [workers] at the same levels that 
they employed before the onset of the public health crisis and subsequent economic fallout”).  
21 See Lucian Bebchuk & Roberto Tallarita, The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance (Feb. 26, 2020) 
(unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3544978. 
22 See Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note [●]; Press Release, Council of Institutional Investors Responds to Business 
Roundtable Statement on Corporate Purpose (Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.cii.org/aug19_brt_response. 
23 See generally Oliver Hart & Luigi Zingales, Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare Not Market Value, 
2 J. L., Fin. & Accounting 247 (2017) (distinguishing between the shareholder welfare and the firm’s market value). 
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are acting in a responsible and sustainable manner.  The first principle is that corporations may 
only conduct lawful business by lawful means.24   
This may seem mundane, but that does not undermine its importance.  Under flexible 
chartering statutes, corporations are now typically free to enter into any new business line.25  But, 
the bottom line is that any new business must be legitimate and above board, in the sense that it 
is a line of business that society permits.  Likewise, there is an important means limitation that 
still checks corporate behavior, which is that any strategy or tactic employed to help the 
company succeed must be lawful, too.   
Precisely because of this statutory mandate, corporate fiduciaries are imbued with 
substantial discretion to manage their corporations in an “other-regarding” manner.,26  Like a 
human citizen, corporations can consciously choose to avoid ambiguous grey areas of conduct 
that risk violating the law.27  Like a human citizen, a corporation can decide that its reputation 
                                                 
24 8 Del. C. § 101(b) (“A corporation may be incorporated or organized under this chapter to conduct or promote any 
lawful business or purposes.”); Model Corporation Act § 3.01(a) (“Every corporation incorporated under this Act 
has the purpose of engaging in any lawful business unless a more limited purpose is set forth in the articles of 
incorporation.”); In re Massey Energy Co. Derivative & Class Action Litig., 2011 WL 2176479, at *[●] (Del. Ch. 
May 31, 2011) (“Delaware does not charter law breakers.  Delaware law allows corporations to pursue diverse 
means to make a profit, subject to a critical statutory floor, which is the requirement that Delaware corporations only 
pursue ‘lawful business’ by ‘lawful acts.’” (quoting Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 101(b)); City of Birmingham Ret. & 
Relief Sys. v. Good, 177 A.3d 47, 65 (Del. 2017) (Strine, C.J., dissenting) (observing that “fiduciaries of a Delaware 
corporation may not” cause the company “to flout its environmental responsibilities [to] reduce its costs of 
operations, and by that means, increase its profitability”); Metro Commc’n Corp. BVI v. Advanced Mobilecomm 
Techs., Inc., 854 A.2d 121, 131 (Del. Ch. 2004) (“Under Delaware law, a fiduciary may not choose to manage an 
entity in an illegal fashion, even if the fiduciary believes that the illegal activity will result in profits for the entity.”); 
Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 934-35 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“Delaware corporate law has long been clear . . . that 
it is utterly inconsistent with one’s duty of fidelity to the corporation to consciously cause the corporation to act 
unlawfully.”); In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 2006) (“A failure to act in good faith 
may be shown . . . where [a] fiduciary acts with intent to violate applicable positive law.”). 
25 See supra note [●].   
26 See LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH 30-31 (2012) (arguing that directors lose their discretion 
under the business judgment rule “only when a public corporation is about to stop being a public corporation”); 
Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 738, 756-62 (2005) 
(arguing that managers always have “some legal discretion (implicit or explicit) to sacrifice corporate profits in the 
public interest” and that there is a “fiduciary duty to comply with the law even when compliance requires sacrificing 
profits”).   
27 For an insightful analysis of how corporate law treats corporate lawbreaking, see Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate 
Disobedience, 68 DUKE L.J. 709 (2019). 
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for above-board conduct, for acting in a manner that does not skirt the law and that shows respect 
for society, is valuable, and based on that business judgment, a corporation can also embrace a 
culture that gives primacy to ethical practices, even when such practices might not generate the 
most profit.28   
This first principle also helps illustrate our central point, which is that a corporation’s 
plan to fulfill its legal compliance obligations should not be seen as something separate and 
distinct from the corporation’s plan to operate in a sustainable, ethical manner with fair regard 
for all the corporation’s stakeholders.  Rather, when viewed through the correct prism, there 
should not be two plans for these related objectives, because the objectives are not in fact 
meaningfully distinct.   
                                                 
28 See, e.g., Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1152-54 (Del. 1989) (reasoning that the 
fiduciaries’ “zealousness” in preserving the company’s “‘culture,’ i.e., its perceived editorial integrity in 
journalism,” supported the trial court’s finding that the board’s decision “was entitled to the protection of the 
business judgment rule”); eBay Domestic Holdings v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 33 (Del. Ch. 2010) (Chandler, C.) 
(“When director decisions are reviewed under the business judgment rule, this Court will not question rational 
judgments about how promoting non-stockholder interests—be it through making a charitable contribution, paying 
employees higher salaries and benefits, or more general norms like promoting a particular corporate culture—
ultimately promote stockholder value.”); Shlensky ex rel. Chi. Nat’l League Ball Club (Inc.) v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 
776, 778, 780 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968) (holding that the business judgment rule applied to the decision to protect the 
culture of baseball as a daytime, not nighttime, sport); see also Barnali Choudhury, Serving Two Masters:  
Incorporating Social Responsibility into the Corporate Paradigm, 11 U. Pa. J. Bus. L. 632, 669 (2009) (“In fact, 
profits may not fully represent the long-term value of the corporation.  Thus, issues of goodwill, reputation, 
preservation of culture, or other deeply held firm values may need to factor into the analysis of determining which 
outcome most closely aligns with the best interests of the corporation”) (footnote omitted).  Indeed, outside of 
Delaware, a majority of American states have adopted constituency statutes that explicitly allow directors to 
consider interests other than stockholders when making corporate decisions.  See Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra, at 17 
(listing the stakeholder groups that directors can take into account when making decisions under different states’ 
constituency statutes).  That said, in the narrow context of the sale of corporate control to a third party for cash or so 
long as the fiduciaries do not “openly eschew[]” any connection between their actions and stockholder welfare., 
Delaware does impose a duty on boards to act as an auctioneer and maximize share price above all else.  See eBay 
Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 32-35 (Del. Ch. 2010) (rescinding a poison pill after finding that 
the company’s fiduciaries deployed the pill “to defend a business strategy that openly eschews stockholder wealth 
maximization” at the expense of a large minority stockholder); Revlon Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 
Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 183 (Del. 1986) (“The Revlon board’s authorization permitting management to negotiate a 
merger or buyout with a third party was a recognition that the company was for sale. The duty of the board had thus 
changed from the preservation of Revlon as a corporate entity to the maximization of the company’s value at a sale 
for the stockholders’ benefit.”). 
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The reasons why are easy to grasp if you think concretely about the basic obligations the 
law imposes for compliance and the basic obligations that proponents of sustainable, stakeholder 
governance advocate.  Let’s start with compliance.   
The primary source of the obligation to conduct business lawfully stems from the reality 
that corporations cannot exist without the blessing of society.29  You cannot call limited liability 
in the state of nature, or declare a business separate from its founders.  That requires law, and the 
bottom line of the authorization to act as a business entity is that the business obey the law.   
In the landmark Caremark decision, Chancellor Allen articulated the corresponding 
fiduciary duty that corporate directors owed to honor this first principle of statutory corporate 
law.30  In his decision, Chancellor Allen observed that: 
Corporate boards may [not] satisfy their obligation to be reasonably 
informed concerning the corporation, without assuring themselves 
that information and reporting systems exist in the organization that 
are reasonably designed to provide to senior management and to the 
board itself timely, accurate information sufficient to allow 
management and the board, each within its scope, to reach informed 
judgments concerning both the corporation’s compliance with law 
and its business performance.31   
 
                                                 
29 William W. Bratton, The “Nexus of Contracts” Corporation:  A Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 407, 424 
(1989) (“The corporate entity represented a state-created juridical structure only—a ‘legal fiction’ or an ‘artificial 
entity.’ The consensus picture conceptually distinguished this juridical form.”); Elizabeth Pollman, 
Constitutionalizing Corporate Law, 69 VAND. L. REV. 639, 644 (2016) (“A corporation comes into being with a 
charter, which reflects a grant of authority from a sovereign.”).  See generally David Cieply, Beyond Public and 
Private: Toward a Political Theory of the Corporation, 107 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 139, 142-45 (2013) (arguing that 
“the corporation is governmental in provenance” due to its dependence on government for its personhood and 
governance rights); KATHARINA PISTOR, THE CODE OF CAPITAL: HOW THE LAW CREATES WEALTH AND INEQUALITY 
(2019) (explaining the role of the law in “coding” assets, including stock); STEVEN K. VOGEL, MARKETCRAFT: HOW 
GOVERNMENTS MAKE MARKETS WORK 17-20 (2018) (examining the role of government in constituting the 
corporation). 
30 In re Caremark Int’l Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).   
31 Id. at 970.   
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Caremark and other developments such as the federal sentencing guidelines32 stimulated 
an increased focus on the need for corporations to adopt sound procedures to ensure that they 
were conducting their business in a lawful manner.  Although liability under Caremark is hard to 
prove,33 scholars have viewed the case as having enormous value in encouraging more intensive 
diligence in the area of compliance,34 amplified by the scrutiny of regulators who have imposed 
substantial penalties on corporations that have run afoul of the law with weak compliance 
programs.35  Indeed, despite the fact that Caremark cases rarely result in legal liability,36 leading 
corporate counsel regularly remind directors of this duty.37  And recent Caremark decisions 
denying the defendants’ motions to dismiss have resulted in renewed attention to directors’ 
oversight obligations.38 
                                                 
32 See USSG § 8B2.1 (outlining the necessary requirements for a corporation to have “an effective compliance and 
ethics program” including “exercise[ing] due diligence to prevent and detect criminal conduct” and “promot[ing] an 
organization culture that encourages ethical conduct and a commitment to compliance with the law”). 
33 Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 372 (Del. 2006) (“[A] claim that directors are subject to personal liability for 
employee failures is possibly the most difficult theory in corporation law upon which a plaintiff might hope to win a 
judgment.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 (Del. Ch. 2003) (“A 
Caremark claim is a difficult one to prove.”); In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. 
Ch. 1996) (“The theory here advanced is possibly the most difficult theory in corporation law upon which a plaintiff 
might hope to win a judgment.”).  
34 Donald C. Langevoort, Commentary, Caremark and Compliance:  A Twenty-Year Lookback, 90 TEMPLE L. REV. 
727, 728 (2018) (“Since [the Caremark decision], compliance has grown in size, scope, and stature at nearly all 
large corporations.”); Miriam Hechler Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 BOSTON COLLEGE L. REV. 949, 
967 (2009) (“Even though the Delaware Supreme Court did not formally adopt Allen’s approach [in Caremark] 
until over a decade later, lawyers and compliance providers responded to Caremark by expanding the level of 
services available to help directors ensure that proper systems were in place to prevent and detect criminal 
violations.”).   
35 For an incisive article discussing the incentives that federal and state law provide to for-profit businesses to 
engage in compliance and monitoring efforts to reduce the likelihood that they will violate the law, see Jennifer 
Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 687 (1997).  
36 See Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate Oversight and Disobedience, 72 VAND. L. REV. 2013, 2031 (2019) (“Oversight 
liability after a trial on the merits is extremely rare. Instead, the case law has developed through settlement opinions 
and motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) and the pre-suit demand requirement of Rule 23.1, with few claims 
surviving such motions.” (footnote omitted)). 
37 See Robert C. Bird, Caremark Compliance for the Next Twenty-Five Years at 14-22 (Mar. 26, 2020) (unpublished 
manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3566279 (analyzing twenty-four law firm client 
memos on the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805 (Del. 2019)). 
38 See Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805 (Del. 2019) (reversing the denial of a motion to dismiss in the food safety 
context); In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. Derivative Litig., 2019 WL 4850188, at *10 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2019) (denying 
motion to dismiss in the pharmaceutical regulatory approval context); Hughes v. Ho, C.A. No. 2019-0112-JTL (Del. 
Ch. Apr. 27, 2020) (financial reporting and oversight context); Intermarketing Grp. USA, Inc. v. Armstrong, 2020 
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With a series of major accounting scandals and a major market-shaking financial crisis all 
occurring within a decade, federal law also substantially enhanced the requirements for 
corporations to address financial risk and seat independent board members as the exclusive 
members of committees relevant to compliance.39  In particular, lawmakers focused on the 
independence of the audit committee and its advisors,40 as well as that of the compensation 
committee.41     
Arguably in tension with these developments, however, was a corresponding movement 
to make corporations more directly responsive to the will of the stock market, at a time when the 
stock market was becoming more characterized by short-term trading.  Thus, at the same time 
that corporations were being admonished for risky practices and told to avoid them, they were 
also being made more responsive to the immediate pressures of the marginal traders, and of 
                                                 
WL 756965 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 2020) (environmental compliance); In re McKesson Corporation Derivative 
Litigation, 2018 WL 2197548 (N.D. Cal. May 14, 2018) (controlled substance compliance). 
39 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 § 301 (requiring the Securities and Exchange 
Commission to direct the national securities exchanges to “prohibit the listing of any security of an[y] issuer that is 
not in compliance with the” requirement that each member of a company’s audit committee be independent); see 
also NYSE Listed Company Manual Section 303A.07 (“The audit committee must have a minimum of three 
members. All audit committee members must satisfy the requirements for independence”); Nasdaq Listing Rule 
5605(c)(2) (requiring that “[e]ach Company must have, and certify that it has and will continue to have, an audit 
committee of at least three members, each of whom must: (i) be an Independent Director.”).   
40 See sources cited in supra note 39; Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, §§ 201-209. 
41 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, § 952 
(2010). 
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activist hedge funds.42  Staggered boards became largely extinct at the biggest companies;43 
withheld votes were used to intimidate independent directors;44 and proxy contests and pressure 
campaigns grew not only in frequency, but in their rate of success.45  Not coincidentally, this 
time period coincided with predominance of institutional investors over human stockholders, a 
predominance that facilitated collective action to change corporate management and strategy.  
Although investors had been burnt badly in two market downturns by excessive corporate risk 
taking for short-term profit and unethical business practices, stockholder initiatives focused on 
making companies more, rather than less, responsive to immediate market pressures and paid 
little to no attention to issues like risk management.46  Governance rules moved strongly in the 
direction institutional investors preferred and corporate directors regularly faced mini-
                                                 
42 Edward B. Rock, Adapting to the New Shareholder-Centric Reality, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1907, 1922-23 (2013) 
(noting that the “cumulative effects” of changes brought about by activists, such as eliminating staggered boards, 
“be seen in how directors’ self-understanding of their roles has evolved” to be more stockholder-centric); John C. 
Coffee, Jr. & Darius Palia, The Wolf at the Door:  The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism on Corporate Governance, 
41 J. CORP. L. 545, 572 (2016) (observing that activists have gained increased power through their association with 
pension funds and institutional investors); Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency 
Capitalism:  Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 897-99 (2013) 
(documenting activists increased importance to the governance landscape, especially because of the rise of 
institutional investors); see also Mark R. Desjardine & Rodolphe Durand, Disentangling the Effects of Hedge Fund 
Activism on Firm Financial and Social Performance, 41 STRAT. MGMT. J. 1054 (2020) (showing that activist 
success is shareholder-centric, short-lived, and may harm other constituencies through decreases in operating cash 
flow, investment, and corporate social performance); Yonca Ertimur, Fabrizio Ferri & Stephen Stubben, Board of 
Directors’ Responsiveness to Shareholders:  Evidence from Shareholder Proposals, 16 J. CORP. FIN. 53 (2010) 
(finding that directors who adopt shareholder proposals supported by a majority of shareholders experience a 20% 
reduction in their likelihood of losing their board seat or other director positions).   
43 See KOSMAS PAPADOPOULOS ET AL., U.S. BOARD STUDY: BOARD ACCOUNTABILITY PRACTICES REVIEW 5 (2018) 
[hereinafter, PAPADOPOULOUS ET AL., BOARD STUDY], https://www.issgovernance.com/file/publications/board-
accountability-practices-review-2018.pdf (noting the proportion of S&P 500 companies that elect directors annually 
grew from 59% in 2009 to 87% in 2017). 
44 See Yonca Ertimur, Fabrizio Ferri & David Oesch, Understanding Uncontested Director Elections (Working 
Paper, August 14, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2447920 (documenting empirically 
that shareholders withhold votes affect how boards and companies operate); PAPADOPOULOS ET AL., BOARD STUDY, 
supra note [●], at 6-7 (noting the proportion of S&P 500 companies that use majority voting grew from 59% in 2009 
to 92% in 2017).   
45  The rate of proxy contest success has grown considerably in the recent past.  As a result of their demonstrated 
capacity to win fights, activists have been increasingly able to win by extracting settlements from corporate boards.  
Thus, the percentage of board seats awarded to an activist per campaign has grown steadily, and in 2018, activists 
won an average of 0.81 seats per campaign,  up 103% from 2016.  See Sullivan & Cromwell, Review and Analysis of 
2019 U.S. Shareholder Activism *15, 
https://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/2019ShareholderActivismAnnualReport.pdf.    
46 See supra note [●].   
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3664021
 
16 
 
referendums in which investors could express their dismay over any current adverse 
development.47  And using the many tools they were given to pressure management, activist 
investors, aided by other institutional investors, pushed companies to deliver immediate returns, 
at the risk of being ousted from office or otherwise being publicly embarrassed.48 
This new dynamic led naturally to an intense focus by corporations on pleasing 
stockholders, even if doing so harms other key stakeholders such as creditors and, most 
importantly, employees.  During this period, the traditional gainsharing from increased corporate 
                                                 
47 See generally PAPADOPOULOS ET AL., BOARD STUDY, supra note [●] (documenting the changes in governance at 
S&P Composite 1500 companies from 2009 to 2017).  See also Fang Chen et al., Not All Threats Are Taken 
Equally: Evidence from Proxy Fights, 55 FIN. REV. 145, 147 (2020) (analyzing the effects of proxy fight threats on 
corporate behavior and concluding “that even a small likelihood to be targeted in a proxy fight can serve as an 
effective disciplinary mechanism”); KOSMAS PAPADOPOULOS ET AL., THE LONG VIEW: THE ROLE OF SHAREHOLDER 
PROPOSALS IN SHAPING U.S. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, 2000-2018 (2019) (documenting the role of shareholder 
proposals in changing U.S. corporate governance); Stephen J. Choi et al., Does Majority Voting Improve Board 
Accountability?, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1119 (2016) (empirically examining the effects of majority voting).  Aside from 
their success in using proxy fights, withhold campaigns, and the stockholder proposal process to influence corporate 
strategies and to tilt governance rules more toward a referendum approach to governance, institutional investors 
have also used the say on pay mechanism to put pressure on companies.  When a company’s performance declines, 
institutional investors and the proxy advisory firms will often vote against the exact same pay plan they have 
supported for several years running, in order to express their dissatisfaction, making the say on pay vote more of a 
say on current performance vote.  Jill Fisch, Darius Palia & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Is Say on Pay All About Pay?  
The Impact of Firm Performance, 8 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 101, 103 (2018) (“Through our analysis of say on pay votes 
cast between 2011 and 2016, we find that both excess compensation and pay-performance sensitivity affect the level 
of shareholder support for executive compensation packages. Surprisingly, however, we also find that, even after 
controlling for these variables, a critical additional driver of low shareholder support for executive compensation 
packages is the issuer’s economic performance. Say on pay votes reflect, to a large degree, shareholder 
dissatisfaction with firm performance and are not based solely on pay.”).  Sometimes this pressure extends to then 
withholding votes on the directors on the targeted company’s compensation committee.  See 2019 Proxy Season 
Review:  Part 2 (Sullivan & Cromwell, July 25, 2019), https://www.sullcrom.com/files/upload/SC-Publication-
2019-Proxy-Season-Review-Part-2-ISS-Negative-Recommendations-Against-Directors.pdf (documenting ISS’s 
high withhold or against recommendation for directors who are unresponsive to negative say-on-pay votes and other 
stockholder proposals).   
48 See Christopher Whittall, Activist Investors Are Spending More and Shifting Their Strategies, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 
6, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/activist-investors-are-spending-moreand-shifting-their-strategies-
1544101200 (“Some activist victories have come from getting passive shareholders to support their demands, adding 
additional pressure. Passive funds, which account for 20% of global investment-fund assets versus 8% a decade 
earlier, can be helpful allies for activists looking to overcome board-level resistance . . . .”); Coffee & Palia, supra 
note [], at 572 (finding that activists’ influence is growing in part because of their ability to partner with pension 
funds and mutual funds); Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88 TEX L. REV. 987, 995 (2010) (noting 
“the change by mutual funds and public pension funds to a more confrontational mode of activism”); Lyman 
Johnson, A Fresh Look at Director “Independence”: Mutual Fund Fee Litigation and Gartenberg at Twenty-Five, 
61 VAND. L. REV. 497, 534 n.228 (2008) (“Mutual fund culture may currently be changing in another respect, as 
well—the increased willingness of mutual funds to be more ‘activist’ investors, just as public pension funds and 
other institutional investors have been doing for some time on various corporate governance issues.”).  
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profitability and productivity between employees (in the form of salary increases) and 
stockholders (in the form of dividends and other returns) markedly tilted toward stockholders 
and top corporate management.49  This tilt has contributed to much greater inequality and 
growing economic insecurity and dissatisfaction.50  Likewise, some observers have expressed 
concern that the avid pursuit of stock market gains has led corporations to be insensitive (or 
                                                 
49 We are not arguing in this article that this reduction in gainsharing can be causally attributed to the interaction of 
greater company responsiveness to stockholders and a simultaneous weakening of worker leverage.  That is a 
complex question and one on which distinguished economists have come to different conclusions, although we note 
that a thorough new study does reach  that conclusion.  Anna Stansbury & Lawrence Summers, The Declining 
Worker Power Hypothesis: An Explanation For The Recent Evolution of the American Economy (NBER Working 
Paper 27913, 2020), http;//www.nber.org/papers/w 27913 (concluding that the combined effect of eroding worker 
leverage and increasing stockholder power over companies has contributed importantly to the decline in gainsharing 
with American workers).  See also Frank Levy & Peter Temin, Inequality and Institutions in 20th Century America 
(NBER Working Paper 13106, 2007), https://www.nber.org/papers/w13106.pdf (providing an institutional 
explanation for changes in income distribution).  For present purposes, we confine ourselves solely to observing the 
undisputed change in gainsharing, its effect on workers, and the pressures put on our corporate governance system 
by concerns about that effect.  Historically, workers shared ratably in the increased wealth society generated.  From 
1948 to 1979, worker productivity grew by 108.1% while workers’ wages grew by 93.2%.  Despite the increased 
productivity and education of American workers, the corporate governance system has shifted over the last decades 
to prioritize stockholders and capital gains over fair gainsharing that shares the fruits of prosperity with all.  See 
Economic Policy Institute, the Productivity-Pay Gap (July 2019), https://www.epi.org/productivity-pay-gap/.  
Likewise, during this period, senior executives were compensated much better than the average worker, but not by 
an astronomical amount.  Lawrence Mishel & Julia Wolfe, CEO Compensation Has Grown 940% Since 1978 (Econ. 
Pol’y Inst., Aug. 14, 2019), https://www.epi.org/files/pdf/171191.pdf (showing that the average CEO-to-worker pay 
ratio was 20-to-1 in 1965).  Since the 1980s, this equal gainsharing has eroded.  From 1979 to 2018, worker 
productivity rose by 69.6%, but the wealth created by these productivity gains went predominately to executives and 
stockholders, with worker pay rising by only 11.6% during this period, while CEO compensation grew by 940%.  
Econ. Pol’y Inst., supra note [●].  That is, over the past forty years, increases in societal wealth have primarily 
benefited the stockholders, not workers.  See Michael T. Owyang & Hannah G. Shell, Taking Stock:  Income 
Inequality and the Stock Market, ECON. SYNOPSES (2016), https://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/economic-
synopses/2016/04/29/taking-stock-income-inequality-and-the-stock-market/ (asserting that “ as stock prices and 
capital returns increase, the wealthy might benefit more than other individuals earning income from labor” and 
showing that “[t]he steady increase in U.S. income inequality from the 1970s through the early 2000s was 
accompanied by strong gains in the stock market”).   
50 See generally Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century (Harvard 2014) (documenting growing 
inequality throughout the US and other OECD countries); Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, Income Inequality in 
the United States, 1913-1998, Q. J. Econ. 118 (2003) (same).  Growing inequality has resulted, in part, in increased 
economic instability.  Austin Nicholas & Philipp Rehm, Income Risk in 30 Countries, 60 Rev. Income & Wealth 
S98 (2014) (documenting the rise of economic insecurity in America); see also Atul Gawande, Why Americans Are 
Dying From Despair, New Yorker (Mar. 23, 2020) (reviewing Anne Case and Angus Deaton’s book Deaths of 
Despair and the Future of Capitalism and noting that deaths of despair—that is, deaths from suicide, overdoses, and 
other premature causes of deaths in adults—are correlated with “the percentage of a local population that is 
employed”).  And this economic instability, coupled with growing inequality, likely contributes to the fact that in 
2017, for instance, “[j]ust 37% of Americans believe[d] that today’s children will grow up to be better off 
financially than their parents.”  Bruce Stokes, Public Divided on Prospects for the Next Generation (Pew Research 
Ctr., June 5, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2017/06/05/2-public-divided-on-prospects-for-the-next-
generation/. 
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worse) to the long-term consequences of their conduct for the planet’s health and the health and 
welfare of their consumers.51   
One consequence of this growth in inequality and economic insecurity has been an 
increasing sense that corporations need to do more than the legal minimum and that the so-called 
stockholder wealth maximization principle is not just legally erroneous, but socially harmful.  
Not only that, it began to dawn on even mainstream institutional investors that most of the 
ultimate investors whose money the institutions manage are human beings who invest for long-
term objectives like college for their kids and retirement for themselves.52  One of us has further 
argued that because these human investors owe their ability to save mostly to their continued 
access to a good job, are stuck-in investors who have to stay invested long term, and pay taxes 
                                                 
51 Unfortunately, it is not difficult for most Americans to recall  numerous examples of corporations behaving 
callously toward their stakeholders, be they consumers, workers, or the communities and environment in which 
businesses operate.  Increasingly, investors and business leaders are also skeptical that corporations who cut ethical 
and legal corners will be sustainably profitable, because conduct of that kind tends to get found out over the long 
term.  E.g., McKinsey, Short-Termism and the Threat from Climate Change (Apr. 2015), 
https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/strategy-and-corporate-finance/our-insights/short-termism-and-the-
threat-from-climate-change; Jamie Dimon & Warren E. Buffet, Short-Termism Is Harming the Economy, WALL ST. 
J. (June 6, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/short-termism-is-harming-the-economy-1528336801; Magali A. 
Delmas, Nicholas Nairn-Birch & Jinghui Lim, Dynamics of Environmental and Financial Performance: The Case of 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 28 Org. & Envir. 374 (2015) (observing that companies who adopt environmentally 
friendly policies suffer a decline in short-term financial performance and postulating that such a decline may 
contribute to corporation’s weariness to adopt such policies).   
52 BLACKROCK, BLACKROCK INVESTMENT STEWARDSHIP: 2018 ANNUAL REPORT 1 (2018), 
https://www.BlackRock.com/corporate/literature/publication/blk-annualstewardship-report-2018.pdf (“BlackRock’s 
number one focus, as a fiduciary investor, is on generating the long-term sustainable financial returns on which our 
clients depend to meet their financial goals.”); Policies and Guidelines Environmental and Social Matters, 
VANGUARD (2018), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20190220221801/https://about.vanguard.com/investmentstewardship/policies-and-
guidelines/ (highlighting that Vanguard “actively engages with portfolio companies and their boards to discuss 
material risks, ranging from business and operational risks to environmental and social risks” but understands that it 
“is required to manage [its] funds in the best interests of shareholders and obligated to maximize returns . . . to help 
shareholders meet their financial goals”); Proxy Voting and Engagement Guidelines, North America (United States 
and Canada), STATE STREET GLOBAL ADVISERS 8 (Mar. 2018), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20180723160412/https://www.ssga.com/investmenttopics/environmental-social-
governance/2018/03/Proxy-Voting-and-Engagement-GuidelinesNA-20180301.pdf (emphasizing that “[w]ell-
developed environmental and social management systems . . . generate efficiencies and enhance productivity, both 
of which impact shareholder value in the long-term”).  About Us, FIDELITY INT’L, 
https://fidelityinternational.com/about-us/ (announcing that Fidelity “think[s] generationally and invests for the long 
term”).     
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and consume products and services, they are not served by a corporate governance system that 
encourages gimmicks, pricing bubbles, or externality risk.53 
The increased salience of so-called ESG, today’s word for yesterday’s corporate social 
responsibility, is one manifestation of these developments.  A variety of domestic and 
international sources have put pressure on companies to adopt corporate policies and plans for 
sustainable governance.  In particular, with the increased concern about climate change, a more 
intensive focus on corporate carbon impact has been at the forefront.54  But, other areas of social 
impact have also had salience.  With the online nature of commerce, immense attention has been 
given to data security and the appropriate use of sensitive consumer and employee information.  
Corporate practices that seem Orwellian to the public have come under intense scrutiny.55  
                                                 
53 See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite? A Flesh-and-Blood Perspective on Hedge Fund 
Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System, 126 YALE L.J. 1870 (2017) (citing the economic data 
supporting these propositions); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward Fair and Sustainable Capitalism: A Comprehensive 
Proposal to Help American Workers, Restore Fair Gainsharing between Employees and Shareholders, and Increase 
American Competitiveness by Reorienting Our Corporate Governance System Toward Sustainable Long-Term 
Growth and Encouraging Investments in America’s Future (U. Pa. Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 19-39, 2019), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3461924 (proposing to reform our corporate governance 
system so that it more aligned with the economic interests of American worker-investors).   
54 For instance, the fact that teen climate activist Greta Thunberg was named TIME’s person of the year is evidence 
that climate and carbon emissions are top of mind.  Charlotte Alter, Suyin Haynes & Justin Worland, Person of the 
Year 2019 (TIME), https://time.com/person-of-the-year-2019-greta-thunberg/.  And cultural awareness is converging 
with investor awareness.  In 2020, Larry Fink, BlackRock’s CEO, focused his annual letter to CEOs on 
environmental concerns.  Larry Fink, A Fundamental Reshaping of Finance (BlackRock), 
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/larry-fink-ceo-letter.  And in December 2019, a group of 
institutional investors representing over $37 trillion in assets wrote a letter to world leaders urging them to take 
ambitious steps to tackle climate change.  CERES, Record 631 Institutional Investors Managing More Than $37 
Trillion in Assets Urge Governments to Step Up Ambition to Tackle Global Climate Crisis, 
https://www.ceres.org/news-center/press-releases/record-631-institutional-investors-managing-more-37-trillion-
assets-urge.  Companies are responding to this pressure.  See Steven Mufson, More U.S. Businesses Making 
Changes in Response to Climate Concerns (June 11, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-
environment/more-us-businesses-making-changes-in-response-climate-concerns/2019/06/10/a30c86ac-8944-11e9-
98c1-e945ae5db8fb_story.html.   
55 See, e.g., Jack Nicas, Karen Weise & Mike Isaac, How Each Big Tech Company May Be Targeted by Regulators, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/08/technology/antitrust-amazon-apple-facebook-
google.html; Sara Fischer, Top Regulators Battle To Crack Down on Big Tech Giants (Axios, Sept. 17, 2019), 
https://www.axios.com/big-tech-regulation-multiple-investigations-ftc-doj-ebdfd6ab-1fbb-40ea-ae08-
89299d58a11e.html; Elizabeth Warren, Here’s How We Can Break Up Big Tech (Medium, Mar. 8, 2019), 
https://medium.com/@teamwarren/heres-how-we-can-break-up-big-tech-9ad9e0da324c; Audrey Wilson, European 
Union Unveils Proposed Tech Rules (For. Pol’y Feb 19, 2020), https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/02/19/european-
union-digital-strategy-proposed-tech-rules-regulation-artificial-intelligence-vestager-zuckerberg-facebook-google-
apple-competition-brussels/; Matina Stevis-Gridneff, E.U.’s New Digital Czar: ‘Most Powerful Regulatory of Big 
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Largely left out of this early stage of the ESG movement was an important corporate 
constituency:  employees.   
The omission of employees from ESG discussions has begun to change as dissatisfaction 
over stagnant employee wages and growing inequality became too hard to totally ignore.  
Among policymakers, there has a come a growing interest in the co-determination model,56 and 
the U.K. government recently adopted a governance code calling for companies to require a 
board-level focus on the best interests of the workforce.57  Recognizing these developments, we 
will use the term “EESG” to incorporate the interests of employees into the ESG framework 
instead of just “burying them in the S.”58   
Perhaps the most prominent evidence that the EESG movement has had traction is the 
Business Roundtable’s new statement on corporate governance, which highlighted that 
businesses “share a fundamental commitment to all of our stakeholders.”59  One need not be 
convinced that this statement reflects a genuine commitment to stakeholder governance or 
                                                 
Tech on the Planet’ (N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/10/world/europe/margrethe-
vestager-european-union-tech-regulation.html.   
56 See S. 3348, Accountable Capitalism Act, 115th Cong. (2018) (requiring the SEC, in consultation with the NLRB, 
to issue a rule that would mandate that at least 40% of a company’s board of directors is elected by the company’s 
employees); S. 915, Reward Work Act, 116th Cong. (2019) (requiring at least one third of directors to be elected by 
employees); Corporate Accountability and Democracy, Bernie, https://berniesanders.com/issues/corporate-
accountability-and-democracy/ (last visited Apr. 25, 2020) (proposing that 45% of directors be elected by workers). 
57 The UK Corporate Governance Code (July 2018), https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/88bd8c45-50ea-4841-
95b0-d2f4f48069a2/2018-UK-Corporate-Governance-Code-FINAL.pdf (“For engagement with the workforce, one 
or a combination of the following methods should be used [1] a director appointed from the workforce; [2] a formal 
workforce advisory panel; [or 3] a designated non-executive director”). 
58 Some commentators and market participants have lumped employees into the “social” prong of ESG.  See, e.g., 
S&P Global, What is the “S” in ESG?, https://www.spglobal.com/en/research-insights/articles/what-is-the-s-in-esg 
(noting that “[s]ocial factors to consider in sustainable investing include a company’s strengths and weaknesses in 
dealing with social trends, labor, and politics”) (emphasis added); Blackrock, ESG Integration, 
https://www.blackrock.com/institutions/en-us/solutions/sustainable-investing/esg-integration (“Social (S) [i]ncludes  
labour issues and product liability, risks such as data security, and stakeholder opposition.”); Vanguard, ESG 
Investing:  Where Your Money Can Reflect What Matters to You, https://investor.vanguard.com/investing/esg/ 
(“Social [includes] [r]elationships with employees, suppliers, clients & communities.”).     
59 Business Roundtable, Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation, https://opportunity.businessroundtable.org/wp-
content/uploads/2020/03/BRT-Statement-on-the-Purpose-of-a-Corporation-with-Signatures.pdf.  For a thoughtful 
discussion of the skepticism that exists regarding the BRT and institutional investor statements regarding ESG and 
stakeholders, see Lisa M. Fairfax, Corporate Purpose and Credible Commitment, [] (2020).  
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improved corporate practices to recognize that the statement was not lightly made, that it reflects 
recognition by the most influential business leaders that more was expected of them, and that if 
they did not answer the call themselves, new legal mandates could be imposed.   
In reaction to this EESG movement, corporations have taken action to adopt policies and 
practices reflecting their commitment to sustainable governance and ethical treatment of 
stakeholders.60  For corporate managers and directors, however, this has come with the natural 
cynicism of the experienced, folk who have been through waves of buzzwords and who 
remember only too recently being asked to focus on corporate governance ratings that were 
obsessed with things like eliminating takeover defenses, paying top management in options 
rather than salary, and making boards subject to stockholder demands.   
Managers and directors are struggling with how to implement a commitment to good 
EESG practices, along with all their pre-existing legal obligations and business requirements.  
How do we do this new thing?  Where does responsibility for it rest on a day-to-day level in the 
company?  Who should we be hearing from on a regular basis to ensure that the company is 
progressing towards these goals?  And what committee of the board should take charge of it?   
This is a natural concern, and one that must be addressed if the goal is for corporations to 
act in a more sustainable and ethical manner.  If EESG just becomes another add-on to a list of 
already difficult-to-accomplish checklist items, the proponents of greater corporate social 
                                                 
60 See, e.g., Hannah Zhang, Dick’s Sporting Good Will Stop Selling Guns at 440 More Stores, (Mar. 10, 2020), 
https://www.cnn.com/2020/03/10/business/dicks-sporting-goods-remove-guns-from-440-stores/index.html 
(highlighting Dick’s efforts to curb gun sales); Hugh Son, Goldman Won’t Take Companies Public Without ‘At 
Least One Diverse Board Candidate,” CEO Says (Jan 23, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/23/goldman-wont-
take-companies-public-that-dont-have-at-least-one-diverse-board-candidate-ceo-says.html (Goldman Sachs will no 
longer take a company public unless at least one of the company’s board members is considered diverse); Brad 
Smith, Microsoft Will Be Carbon Negative by 2030, https://blogs.microsoft.com/blog/2020/01/16/microsoft-will-be-
carbon-negative-by-2030/ (announcing that Microsoft will decrease its carbon emission to below zero by 2030).   
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responsibility, i.e., EESG, will fail to achieve their worthy purpose.  To the task of avoiding this 
wasteful and harmful outcome, we next turn.  
II.   Toward An Integrated, Efficient, and Effective Approach to Corporate Compliance 
and EESG 
 
Although we understand, given all the buzzwords and seemingly ever-shifting sentiments 
for corporations to focus on some new concern, the impulse toward eye-rolling and cynicism 
over the push for EESG, we are optimistic about EESG for two reasons.  First, the demand that 
corporations treat all their stakeholders and society itself with respect is not a whim; it is a 
fundamentally critical function of every important social institution.61  Second, and more 
instrumentally, because EESG is intrinsic to good corporate management, there is good news:  
There is in fact an efficient and effective method for corporations to embrace quality EESG 
standards that does not simply pile EESG responsibilities on top of existing duties of managers 
and the board.  The method we refer to involves the simple but important recognition that the 
company’s compliance and EESG plans should not be separate, but identical, and that the work 
of implementing that singular plan should be allocated sensibly and consistently across company 
management and across the board’s committee structure itself.  That is, if you already maintain a 
thorough and thoughtful compliance policy, you have a strong start towards a solid EESG policy.   
To grasp why, focus on the most traditional “E” in ESG, the environment.  Without minimizing 
the importance of carbon emissions, let’s not lose sight of the fact that there have been and 
remain other important ways in which corporate conduct affects the environment.  There are 
other sorts of dangerous emissions (e.g., particulate matter), there are other sorts of harmful 
excess (think plastic), and there will be evolving standards as new innovations result in 
unanticipated consequences.  Since before Caremark, environmental concerns have been a core 
                                                 
61 For a comprehensive historical argument to this effect, see generally MAYER, supra note [●]. 
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focus of corporate compliance programs.62  This growing focus on climate change and other 
negative effects of intensive economic activity on the environment has manifested itself in 
litigation under Caremark.63   
This environmental example is not isolated.  To the extent that EESG embraces the 
responsibility to engage in ethical, safe, and non-deceptive conduct toward company 
customers,64 then it also overlaps with compliance.  Many Caremark cases and regulatory 
actions have focused on corporations that engaged in allegedly deceptive or otherwise wrongful 
                                                 
62 See Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 129 140-61 (2013) 
(documenting the emerging private compliance programs and governance organizations that emerged in the 1970s to 
1990s in the wake of landmark environmental legislation, such as the Clean Water Act).   
63 See City of Birmingham Ret. & Relief Sys. v. Good, 177 A.3d 47, 50 (Del. 2017) (plaintiffs alleging Caremark 
claims based on “nine misdemeanor criminal violations of the Federal Clean Water Act”); Intermarketing Grp. USA, 
Inc. v. Armstrong, 2020 WL 756965, at *1, 10-15 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 2020) (alleging oversight claims based on 
liabilities resulting from an oil spill); In re Massey Energy Co., 2011 WL 2176479, at *18-21 (Del. Ch. May 31, 
2011) (alleging Caremark violations stemming from a mine explosion and associated violations of mine safety and 
environmental laws); Mercier v. Blankenship, 662 F. Supp. 2d 565, 571-72, 575-76 (S.D. W. Va. 2009) (similar).   
64 See Bank of America, ESG: Impact on Companies Doing Business in American and Why They Must Care, 
https://www.bofaml.com/content/dam/boamlimages/documents/articles/ID18_0725/esg_impact_on_businesses.pdf 
(noting that part of the “S” in “ESG” includes “a company’s capacity to generate trust and loyalty with its 
workforce, customers and society.  It reflects the company’s reputation and the health of its license to operate . . .”).   
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behavior that exposed consumers to financial harm,65 unsafe products,66 or theft of personal 
data.67   
Similarly, the responsibility to provide employees with safe working conditions,68 an 
environment that is tolerant toward diverse beliefs and backgrounds,69 and fair wages and 
benefits70 overlaps with important compliance duties.  As with other EESG factors, the employee 
factor has been a focus of Caremark cases and actions by regulators.71   
                                                 
65 See Shaev v. Baker, 2017 WL 1735573, at *1, 9-15 (N.D. Cal. May 4, 2017) (Caremark claim based on 
allegations involving Wells Fargo’s account fraud scandal); In re PayPal Holdings, Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 
2018 WL 466527, at *1, 6 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 2018) (Caremark claim based on alleged violations of consumer 
financial protection and privacy laws); Rojas v. Ellison, 2019 WL 3408812 (Del. Ch. 2019) (alleging company’s 
board failed to oversee “compliance with California laws governing price-comparison advertising”); In re Capital 
One Derivative S’holder Litig., 952 F. Supp. 2d 770, 777-79, 785-86 (E.D. Va. 2013) (Caremark claim based on 
alleged consumer financial protection violations involving company’s marketing of payment protection and credit 
monitoring products); Brautigam v. Rubin, 55 F. Supp. 3d 499, 505-507 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (claim based on alleged 
failure to oversee company’s mortgage-servicing operations). 
66 See, e.g., Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 807 (Del. 2019) (alleging Caremark claim based on food safety 
violations); Hutton v. McDaneil, 264 F. Supp. 3d 996, 1010 (D. Ariz. 2017) (same); In re Abbott Labs. Derivative 
S’holders Litig., 325 F.3d 795, 808-09 (7th Cir. 2003) (alleging Caremark claim based on alleged failure to oversee 
compliance with medical device safety regulations); In re General Motors Co. Deriv. Litig., 2015 WL 3958724 (Del. 
Ch. June 26, 2015) (alleging company’s board and management were liable under Caremark due to faulty ignition 
switches leading to personal injury and death to drivers); Salsitz v. Nasser, 208 F.R.D. 589 (E.D. Mich. 2002) 
(alleging company’s board and management recklessly allowed “Bridgestone/Firestone tires [to be installed] on 
Explorer vehicles, even though the tires made the Explore prone to instability and rollovers”); In re TASER Int’l 
S’holder Derivative Litig., 2006 WL 687033, at *17 (D. Ariz. Mar. 17, 2006) (Caremark claim based on alleged 
failure to oversee safety of TASER products); La. Mun. Police Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Pyott, 46 A.3d 313, 316, 351-58 
(Del. Ch. 2012) (Caremark claim based on alleged misbranding of pharmaceutical product), rev’d on other grounds, 
74 A.3d 612 (Del. 2013). 
67 See Corporate Risk Holdings LLC v. Rowlands, 2018 WL 9517195, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2018) (Caremark 
claim based on alleged failure to monitor cybersecurity practices); In re The Home Depot S’holder Derivative Litig., 
223 F. Supp. 3d 1317, 1320-21, 1325-26 (N.D. Ga. 2016) (same); Palkon v. Holmes, 2014 WL 5341880, at *1 
(D.N.J. Oct. 20, 2014) (same). 
68 See generally Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590.   
69 See generally Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241. 
70 See generally Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.  
71 See In re Am. Apparel, Inc. 2014 Derivative S’holder Litig., 2015 WL 12724070, at *2-4, 16-17 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 
28, 2015) (Caremark claim based on founder and CEO’s sexual misconduct toward company employees); In re 
FedEx Corp. S’holder Derivative Litig., 2009 WL 10700362, at *11 (W.D. Tenn. July 20, 2009) (Caremark claim 
based on alleged misclassification of company employees as independent contractors); In re Massey Energy Co., 
2011 WL 2176479, at *18-21 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2011) (Caremark claim based on mine safety violations); In re 
Hecla Min. Co. Derivative S’holder Litig., 2014 WL 689036, at *9 (D. Idaho Feb. 20, 2014) (same); Mercier v. 
Blankenship, 662 F. Supp. 2d 565, 571-72, 575-76 (S.D. W. Va. 2009) (same); South v. Baker, 62 A.3d 1, 6 (Del. 
Ch. 2012) (same).  
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Finally, to the extent that good EESG could be thought to involve yet another E, ethics 
and the overall commitment to conducting business with high integrity and an other-regarding 
spirit, EESG also overlaps with compliance.  Often, behavior that poses an ethical gut check over 
whether it is the right thing to do runs up against legal rules deterring corruption and fraud.  If a 
corporation is worried about whether a payment or concession to a foreign official is kosher, that 
is both a legal compliance concern and an EESG concern.  If a corporation is engaging in 
practices that might, for example, encourage physicians to overprescribe a dangerous drug by a 
combination of financial and social inducements and deceptive minimizations of patient risk, that 
is both a legal compliance concern and an EESG concern.  And as with the previous EESG 
factors, these sorts of perceived ethical lapses have often prompted Caremark suits.72  
This overlap is understandable and unremarkable when you think about it from this 
perspective.  Perhaps the most important foundational question corporate directors and managers 
                                                 
72 See, e.g., In re McKesson Corp. Derivative Litig., 2018 WL 2197548, at *1, 7-12 (N.D. Cal. May 14, 2018) 
(Caremark claim based on alleged maximization of “short-term profits over safety with respect to sales and 
distribution of prescription opioids” and failure to “properly implement a Controlled Substance Monitoring 
Program”); In re SFBC Int’l, Inc. Secs. & Derivative Litig., 495 F. Supp. 2d 477, 479-80, 484-86 (D.N.J. 2007) 
(Caremark case based on “a broad range of alleged misconduct” by a company engaged in clinical testing of 
pharmaceutical products, “from improper personnel choices to the failure to rectify unethical clinical testing 
practices and unsafe conditions at the company’s flagship Miami testing facility”); In re Johnson & Johnson 
Derivative Litig., 865 F. Supp. 2d 545, 562-79 (D.N.J. 2011) (Caremark claims based on alleged regulatory 
violations related to pharmaceutical product recalls, off-label marketing, and kickbacks); Holt v. Golden, 880 F. 
Supp. 2d 199, 201 (D. Mass. 2012) (Caremark claim based on alleged Foreign Corrupt Practices Act violations); In 
re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 2015 WL 13375767, at *2-3, 8 (W.D. Ark. Apr. 3, 2015) 
(same); Midwestern Teamsters Pension Tr. Fund v. Baker Hughes Inc., 2009 WL 6799492, at *1, 6 (S.D. Tex. May 
7, 2009) (same); Strong v. Taylor, 877 F. Supp. 2d 433, 439-40, 448-49 (E.D. La. July 2, 2012) (same); In re Clovis 
Oncology, Inc. Derivative Litig., 2019 WL 4850188, at *10 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2019) (Caremark claim based on 
alleged failure to oversee misconduct in seeking approval of new pharmaceutical product from the Food and Drug 
Administration); Clingman & Hanger Mgmt. Assocs., LLC v. Knobel, 2018 WL 2006763, at *8-12 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 9, 
2018) (Caremark claim based on alleged failure to oversee for-profit school’s compliance with Department of 
Education regulations); Cook v. McCullough, 2012 WL 3488442, at *6, 8 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 13, 2012) (similar); Stone 
v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 364-65 (Del. 2006) (Caremark claim based on Bank Secrecy Act and anti-money-
laundering violations). 
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need to be able to answer to be an effective fiduciary is this one:  How does the company make 
money?73 
The reason why this simple question is powerful is that it forces you to examine closely 
what the company does that results in the ultimate profitable sale of a product or service.  For a 
manufacturing company, this means understanding the product you are making and how you 
make it.  This necessarily requires you to think about who will use the product and for what 
purposes, and the corresponding benefits and risks of doing so.  This necessarily requires you to 
think about your production processes and who they affect and in what manner.  This includes 
the workers involved in production and their safety.  This also includes the environmental impact 
of the plant.   
The same is also true when asking how the product gets sold.  What are the marketing 
practices that we use?  Do we gather information from our consumers that we do not need to 
make the sale?  Are we reselling that information to others?  Are we telling our consumers that 
we do so?  Are we protecting their data?   
Permeating the question of how you make money, of course, will be the issue of what 
human beings are involved in the production and sales process.  Do they have safe working 
conditions?  Do you pay them fairly and give them quality benefits?  Are you keeping workers at 
a full-time part-time hour level to avoid giving them benefits?  Are you using contracted labor?  
Do you require your contractors to extend to their employees the same standards you require for 
treatment of the company’s own employees?  And to what extent do we attribute the success of 
the company to its workforce as a whole as opposed to just top management?  And are we 
matching that thinking to the company’s compensation system?   
                                                 
73 See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Warning—Potential Danger Ahead! (Directors & Boards, Sept. 2004) (“[T]he first question 
you must be able to answer before you can serve responsibly as a director:  How does the company make money?”).   
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What will naturally flow from asking this core question, and the ones that flow out of it, 
is an understanding that the legal regimes likely to be most salient for the company are identical 
to the EESG issues that have the most salience.  Why?  Because society learns from experience, 
and the law is likely to have the most relevance to your company in those areas where the 
company has the most impact on the lives of its stakeholders, be they the company’s workers, its 
consumers, or the communities in which its operations have a material impact.  So too will those 
focused on corporate EESG practices be likely to focus on what is most salient for particular 
companies in particular industries.   
Therefore, by analyzing in a rigorous way how a company makes money, and the impact 
that has on others, you best shape an effective compliance system.  Happily, it is also how best to 
shape an effective EESG plan.  Think about it in this way:  If you are seeking to go beyond the 
legal minimum and to treat all your stakeholders and communities of impact in an ethical and 
considerate manner, you are by definition minimizing the risk that you will not honor the law.  
By trying to engage in best practices, you will have a margin of error that keeps you largely out 
of the legal grey and create a reputation that will stand you in good stead with your stakeholders 
and regulators when there is a situational lapse.   
Even more happily, in addressing EESG’s emerging salience, companies should not 
ignore their past efforts to improve their compliance regimes.  Rather, they should build on their 
prior learning and use the need to report on EESG metrics as an opportunity to become more 
efficient and effective as a company.   
For too many companies, their existing board compliance structures are not well thought 
out, and may result in an imbalanced approach to legal compliance and risk management that 
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hazards failing to identify and address key areas where the company could negatively affect 
stakeholders and society—and run afoul of the law.   
III.   A Practical Way to Think About Organizing and Implementing An Integrative 
Compliance/EESG Strategy 
 
For a public company seeking to do better and to re-organize their compliance and EESG 
functions in an integrated, efficient. and effective manner, the most rational starting point 
involves building on the thought process we have discussed.  The company’s board, 
management, and advisors should identify how the company makes money, and the stakeholders 
it affects in doing so.  Now, you might say, does this mean that the board and management 
should dilate on every source of cash flow.  No, you must use your business judgment, which to 
us implies that you must consider the company’s material sources of business and their impact.  
But, correspondingly, it means making clear as a matter of company policy that the less material 
a source of cash flow a business line is, the more intolerant the company is of conduct that is 
legally, ethically, or socially problematic.  That is, it must be clear that the company does not 
even tolerate entering a grey zone in business lines not core to its financial health, and that the 
company’s overall ethics and compliance policies operate even more stringently when the 
benefit-to-cost ratio for endangering the corporation’s reputation as a good citizen is especially 
poor.   
As to material business lines, top management and the board must carefully address the 
relevant regulatory regimes that constrain the company’s conduct, consider the reasons why that 
is so, and identify the stakeholders whose interests the law seeks to protect.  Relatedly, managers 
and boards should undertake the same inquiry in addressing reputable EESG criteria and their 
application.  Which of these factors is relevant to the business line and what stakeholders are 
they designed to protect?  In this process, managers and boards should attempt to identify the 
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best standards for both compliance and EESG that measure performance in successfully 
addressing these factors.   
The results of these related inquiries should then be integrated.  By way of example, 
consider the environmental “E.”  The company should consider the regulatory regimes that 
constrain the company’s operation of a business line, why those regimes are in place, and the 
corresponding EESG standards that apply.  The concerns addressed by law and EESG standards 
will tend to track.  Does the law already require the company to compile information in relevant 
areas that might be useful in tracking not just bare compliance with law, but also with higher 
objectives of environmentally responsible behavior?  Are there accepted and reputable standards 
by which the company can monitor its fidelity to environmental law, and even better, go further 
and set a higher standard of responsibility?  How might adoption of a voluntary EESG standard 
and the gathering of information necessary to evaluate whether the company was meeting it 
simultaneously act as a safeguard for legal compliance?  The same will almost certainly be the 
case for standards involving the fair treatment of employees, safe working conditions, and other 
elements of being a lawful and ethical employer.   
This is an important—and so far overlooked—point in the ongoing discussion about 
EESG reporting.  A substantial amount of the relevant data required for robust EESG reporting is 
already required to be collected by government regulation or as part of the company’s legal 
compliance monitoring program.  In fact, some of the EESG-relevant information is likely 
already compiled and reported.  To wit, most federal and state regulatory bodies require some 
modicum of ongoing reporting for those entities most likely to cause harm.  Drug manufacturers 
must provide ongoing reports about the efficacy of their products.  Likewise, OSHA requires 
documenting and reporting on workplace hazards and safety.  The list goes on, but the point is 
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that regulatory systems already require disclosure that is essential to a quality EESG monitoring 
and reporting system.  And in the instances in which governments do not formally mandate 
reporting but still set metes and bounds for appropriate conduct, trade and industry groups often 
coalesce around a best practice in terms of monitoring and reporting.  Again, much of the basic 
task of quality EESG reporting is likely already being done by businesses if they are following 
the basic precept of conducting lawful business by lawful means.74   
That said, there is a current challenge that cannot be ignored:  the proliferation of 
different approaches to EESG reporting.75  This proliferation is inefficient, encourages 
greenwashing and gamesmanship of the kind that has characterized corporate governance 
ratings, and threatens to engage companies more in the rhetoric of EESG than the reality of 
managing a corporation with the goal of being other-regarding toward company stakeholders and 
                                                 
74 Several of the leading EESG standards already overlap with key compliance areas.  For example, SASB’s 
Biotechnology & Pharmaceuticals Standard requires reporting around the company’s FDA compliance statistics, 
something already required by the FDA.  Likewise, SASB’s Oil & Gas–Exploration & Production Standard and the 
World Economic Forum’s proposed EESG reporting framework requires companies to report on workplace safety, 
an existing requirement under OSHA.   
75 See Jill Fisch, The Uncertain Stewardship Potential of Index Funds, (“At the present, however, the metrics for 
evaluating the social responsibility of a portfolio company or a socially responsible investment fund are problematic 
– as many commentators have observed, sustainability disclosures are limited, incomplete and largely unreliable.”).  
Indeed, there are tens if not hundreds of ESG-related reporting frameworks currently in circulation.  See, e.g., Global 
Reporting Initiative (GRI) https://www.globalreporting.org/standards/; Sustainability Accounting Standards Board 
(SASB), https://www.sasb.org/standards-overview/download-current-standards/; World Economic Forum, Toward 
Common Metrics and Consistent Reporting of Sustainable Value Creation (Jan. 2020), 
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_IBC_ESG_Metrics_Discussion_Paper.pdf; Final Report:  Recommendation 
of the Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures (June 2017), https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/06/FINAL-2017-TCFD-Report-11052018.pdf.  Even though more companies are disclosing 
EESG-related data, absent standardization, investors will have difficulty comparing the myriad disclosures that 
companies issue based on the current slew of existing frameworks.  See Testimony of John Streuer to Senate 
Banking and Finance Committee (April 2, 2019) (“85% of companies in the S&P 500 already actively report on 
ESG risk factors voluntarily, through corporate sustainability reports or other corporate disclosures. However, much 
of the information provided through voluntary disclosures is difficult to compare and inconsistent across issuers, 
resulting in considerable costs and resource expenditure for investors.”); see also McKinsey & Company, More than 
values: The value-based sustainability reporting that investors want (August 2019) (observing that 85% of investors 
either agree or strongly agree that more standardization of ESG information is required).    
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society.76  Until this proliferation is alleviated by private action or legislation,77 though, the only 
rational way to proceed is for the company’s management and board to exercise judgment and to 
carefully select the standards it believes are the most relevant, informative, and credible.  And 
here, the compliance reporting systems already in place should provide a useful starting point to 
decide what additional standards the company should embrace and which of the contending 
frameworks are the most informative and relevant given the company’s impact on society and its 
stakeholders.  Based on its current understanding of its business and reporting, management and 
the board should be prepared to explain to its stakeholders, including institutional investors and 
EESG organizations, why it selected the standards it did, and how they will help the company 
                                                 
76 For instance, most current disclosure around human capital (the extra E in EESG or part of the S in the traditional 
conception) is done through vague, non-quantitative or boilerplate disclosures.  See Sustainability Accounting 
Standards Board, The State of Disclosure 2017 *21, https://www.sasb.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/08/StateofDisclosure-Report-
web112717.pdf?__hstc=105637852.135a89045bd6ea85f68591478e99eb09.1553809423920.1570492048390.15704
94269935.17&__hssc=105637852.1.1570494269935.  But that may change in the near future.  For example, a group 
of distinguished accounting, business, and academic leaders have developed promising recommendations for 
improving disclosure in the area of human capital.  See, e.g., Coalition for Inclusive Capitalism, Embankment 
Project for Inclusive Capitalism (2018).  And under the leadership of Chairman Clayton, the SEC has pressed for 
more informative disclosure about the worth of and investments in human capital and in areas relevant to how 
corporations treat their employees.  See Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Proposes to Modernize 
Disclosures of Business; Legal Proceedings, and Risk Factors Under Regulation S-K, 
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2019-148 (noting that as part of the SEC’s modernization effort, publicly 
traded companies would be required to include “as a disclosure topic, human capital resources, including any human 
capital measures or objectives that management focuses on in managing the business, to the extent such disclosures 
would be material to an understanding of the registrant’s business, such as, depending on the nature of the 
registrant’s business and workforce, measures or objectives that address the attraction, development, and retention of 
personnel”).  And Professors Jill Fisch and Cynthia Williams have petitioned the SEC on rulemaking related to more 
comprehensive ESG disclosure, although the SEC has yet to act on their petition.  Letter to Brent Fields, Secretary, 
Securities and Exchange Commission, Oct. 1, 2018, https://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2018/petn4-730.pdf.  For 
the SEC to be able to accommodate that demand sensibly, it may well require legislative authorization to take a 
broader perspective on EESG disclosure, recognizing that its value is not just to investors, and to allow it to seek 
help from other agencies, such as the Department of Labor and Environmental Protection Agency, that have 
expertise relevant to setting good EESG reporting standards. 
77 Already, there are private efforts at convergence, particularly in the environmental space.  For example, the Task 
Force for Climate-Related Financial Disclosures is looking to have market players converge around its standard in 
the area of climate change reporting metrics.  See Final Report:  Recommendations of the Task Force on Climate-
related Financial Disclosures (June 2017), https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/FINAL-2017-
TCFD-Report-11052018.pdf.  Ultimately, it may require a combination of government and private sector action to 
provide the coherence needed.  Agreement to implement B minus level reporting metrics by all companies for some 
period, with a goal of improving them to A level might be more valuable than having companies each implementing 
different approaches, thus minimizing the ability for any real comparison of behavior and maximizing the chances 
for greenwashing. 
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best comply with the law and be a good corporate citizen.  Of course, in doing so, it is relevant to 
consider whether there is increasing convergence around certain standards, because 
comparability is an important value for all stakeholders and for government regulators.78  If 
society is serious about EESG, then corporations must be expected to adhere to some level of 
consistency in reporting and be held accountable fairly across common dimensions of concern.   
This line of inquiry should lead to a more disciplined and integrated approach to 
compliance and EESG, and should help reveal the key legally required and company-adopted 
principles and standards that the company will use to encourage ethical behavior and to track 
whether the company and its employees have met or missed the mark.   
When that is done, the next step is critical and has not been done well by many 
companies even when viewed through the narrower lens of compliance alone.  That is the step of 
determining what expertise is needed to implement the company’s compliance and EESG plan, 
how responsibility for that should be allocated among the company’s management team, and, 
correspondingly, how the board should be organized to oversee management’s implementation 
of the adopted plan.   
Diversity is rightly a salient topic in the conversation about corporate citizenship.  But 
diversity is also a hugely relevant consideration when it comes to comprising a board of directors 
and management team that is adroit at managing a sustainably profitable business that acts as a 
solid corporate citizen.  To this point, we are not referring to the idea that having a board and 
management team with diverse socioeconomic, racial, ethnic, national, and gender backgrounds 
might enhance the company’s ability to look at key issues from multiple perspectives, have 
                                                 
78 See supra note 46; see also Mark Carney, Breaking the Tragedy of the Horizon – Climate Change and Financial 
Stability, https://www.bis.org/review/r151009a.pdf (observing that internationally consistent regulatory standards 
are important to producing successful EESG disclosure) 
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greater understanding and empathy toward its stakeholders, and stimulate a more interesting 
intellectual climate useful for innovation and decision making.  That very well may be the case.79   
But for present purposes, we are referring to the more mundane idea that the world is 
complex and that diverse expertise is essential to the ability of most corporations to succeed.  At 
the management level and staff level, this is often well understood, and corporations seek out the 
diverse talent necessary to accomplish their diverse business functions.  In corporations whose 
products involve complex science and safety considerations (say pharmaceuticals), it is vital to 
have employees with the skill set and experience to enable the company not only to develop and 
market new products, but to do so in a manner that is safe to consumers and compliant with the 
intensive regulatory regimes that exist to protect them.  It would be unlikely to see a corporation 
of that kind without employees with relevant educational and industry expertise pervading that 
area of the business’s activity.  At the same time, a pharmaceutical company is also likely to 
have a well-credentialed staff of experts, qualified in areas like accounting and corporate finance, 
to address those functions.  No doubt these different types of experts would gain some 
understanding of each others’ bailiwick through the experience of working in a company in the 
same industry, but no one would think that they could change jobs without great risk to the 
company and society.  
                                                 
79 See, e.g., David Carter, Betty J. Simkins & W. Gary Simpson, Corporate Governance, Board Diversity and Firm 
Performance (Working Paper, Mar. 26, 2002), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=304499 (finding 
a positive correlation between diverse boards and firm value); Lin Liao, Le Luo & Qingliang Tang, Gender 
Diversity, Board Independence, Environmental Committee and Greenhouse Gas Disclosure 47 British Acct’ing 
Rev. 409 (2015) (finding that increased gender diversity on a company’s board of directors is associated with a 
higher propensity for the company to make greenhouse gas disclosures); Stephanie J. Creary, When and Why 
Diversity Improves Your Board’s Performance Har. Bus. Rev. (Mar. 27, 2019),https://hbr.org/2019/03/when-and-
why-diversity-improves-your-boards-performance (discussing strategies for boards to use diversity to improve their 
company’s performance).  But see Corinne Post & Kris Byron, Women on Boards and Firm Financial Performance:  
A Meta-Analysis, 58 Acad. Mgmt. J. 1546 (2014) (finding mixed evidence for the claim that women on boards 
increases a company’s financial performance).   
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The problem, however, is that the same kind of sensible deployment of expertise has not 
characterized how American corporations have addressed risk management, compliance, and 
ESG.  It remains the case that, for a large percentage of American public companies, the audit 
committee is the corporate committee singularly charged with approving and monitoring the 
corporation’s compliance and risk management system.80  This is problematic for two interactive 
reasons: (1) the responsibilities of audit committees in their core domain of accounting and 
financial compliance, prudence, and integrity have grown even more challenging, complex and 
time consuming; and (2) corporations rarely face risk and compliance issues only in the financial 
area, and often have issues of that kind in areas where specialized expertise of a non-financial 
nature is essential to effective management.   
The interactive effect is easy to explain.  With increased complexity in accounting and 
finance has come requirements that audit committees be comprised solely of directors who 
consider themselves financially expert.81  Directors whose background is not in finance, but who 
have other relevant talents, may rightly feel inhibited in declaring themselves to have the depth 
                                                 
80 See NACB Public Company Governance Survey 2019-2020, *18, https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2020/01/2019-2020-Public-Company-Survey.pdf (reporting that 31% of boards locate enterprise 
risk management in the audit committee, while only 16% of boards locate risk management in a risk committee, 
although 51% of boards report that the full board is responsible for risk management); id. at *25 (noting that 63% of 
boards locate compliance responsibilities in the audit committee). 
81 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 407 (requiring the SEC to issues a rule that would require publicly listed 
companies “to disclose whether or not, and if not, the reasons therefor, the audit committee of the [company] is 
comprised of at least 1 member who is a financial expert”).  Likewise, the NYSE and NASDAQ listing rules place 
similar requirements on publicly traded companies.  See NYSE Listing Manual § 303A.07(a) cmt (“each member of 
the audit committee must be financially literate, as such qualification is interpreted by the listed company’s board in 
its business judgment, or must become financially literate within a reasonable period of time after his or her 
appointment to the audit committee. In addition, at least one member of the audit committee must have accounting 
or related financial management expertise, as the listed company’s board interprets such qualification in its business 
judgment.”); Nasdaq Listing Rule 5605(c)(2) (“Each Company must have, and certify that it has and will continue to 
have, an audit committee of at least three members, each of whom must . . . be able to read and understand 
fundamental financial statements, including a Company’s balance sheet, income statement, and cash flow statement. 
Additionally, each Company must certify that it has, and will continue to have, at least one member of the audit 
committee who has past employment experience in finance or accounting, requisite professional certification in 
accounting, or any other comparable experience or background which results in the individual’s financial 
sophistication, including being or having been a chief executive officer, chief financial officer or other senior officer 
with financial oversight responsibilities.”) 
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of finance acumen to qualify.  Relatedly, the reality that financial gimmickry and imprudence 
caused serious economic consequences for the American economy led to increased 
responsibilities for audit committees in both Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank, and 
complementary Exchange Rules reforms.82  These enhanced requirements added time to what 
was already the most burdened board committee.83   
The resulting time pressures have another important effect.  The core duties of an audit 
committee will mean that the CFO, the head of internal audit, and other top finance officers will 
not just want, but need, a lot of time with the audit committee.  To the extent therefore that the 
audit committee’s scope of responsibility over risk management and compliance is company-
wide, there is an obvious danger that the audit committee will not have enough time itself to 
responsibly consider and address non-financial risks.  That is, even if one assumed that it is 
possible to comprise an audit committee that is not only financially expert but also capable of 
adroitly addressing all the diverse risk issues a company faces, the chance that it would have the 
time to do so effectively seems slight.   
And the reality is that it is exceedingly unlikely that the skill set you would wish to 
address the company’s other non-financial risks and compliance issues is identical to that you 
seek in audit committee members.  Much more likely, you would want directors with substantial 
industry and educational expertise in other relevant subjects—such as environmental, food 
safety, data security, drug efficacy, plant and production safety measures, privacy protections, 
etc.—expertise that they likely built up by concentrating in those areas during their careers, and 
                                                 
82 See supra note 52.   
83 See KPMG, Global Board Insights:  Audit Committee Workload, *4, 
https://home.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/pdf/2015/10/audit-committee-workload.pdf (surveying 1,500 audit committee 
members and finding that “the amount of time required to carry out their audit committee responsibilities has 
increased moderately (51%) or significantly (24%) over the past two years. And 40% said it’s becoming 
increasingly difficult to oversee all the major risks on its agenda given the committee’s agenda time and expertise”).   
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3664021
 
36 
 
not in accounting or finance.  Correspondingly, the fact that someone was a top KPMG 
accountant or a CFO at Fortune 100 company may make her an ideal audit committee member.  
But that experience may give her no training or expertise to address food safety risk, or 
cybersecurity.   
As important, the time crunch imposed by core financial and accounting duties means 
that the access that non-financial officers will get to the audit committee will be carefully 
rationed and less than ideal.  It is natural to expect that the CFO and auditors will have an agenda 
of items to accomplish at each audit committee meeting.  Other officers will have to fight for 
time.  This includes the General Counsel, who may often be the most likely to try to make sure 
that every other officer gets some time with the Committee, often at the sacrifice of important 
topics the GC herself might ideally wish to discuss.   
From a business perspective, the resulting allocation of talent and time is suboptimal and 
inefficient.  By consolidating a critical function too tightly in a committee that cannot perform it 
effectively, you risk missing issues, you limit communication between the directors and a more 
diverse set of company officers, and you also are likely to be spreading the work of the board 
across its members in a highly inequitable way.   
The allocation also is counter-intuitive in another obvious sense.  It is unlikely that the 
corporation organizes its management-level approach to risk and compliance in that manner.  
Much more likely, the corporation has developed methods to balance the competing values in 
specialization and generalization, and has developed some industry-specific structures to address 
non-financial risk.  To the extent that at the board level those structures are not replicated in 
some sensible way, the risk is that the board will not be optimally involved in areas of non-
financial risk management that are fundamental to the company.   
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For these reasons, it seems much more effective and efficient to make sure that 
committee-level responsibility for risk management and compliance is thoughtfully allocated 
among the board’s committees, rather than solely vested in the audit committee.  With such a 
thoughtful allocation should come an alignment of officer-to-board-level reporting relationships, 
which has the added value of ensuring that the directors get to know and regularly communicate 
with a broader range of corporate executives.  In an era where it is likely that the only insiders on 
the board will be the CEO and perhaps one other director,84 this is no small benefit in itself, as it 
opens many more windows into the company for the board and creates a much better insight into 
corporate culture.   
More specifically, though, it facilitates management-to-director communication on a 
regular basis on all the material, industry-relevant areas of risk and compliance.  And it does so 
in a way that allows the managers and directors best equipped to identify and deal with risks in 
the first instances the best chance to do so.  Such a structure also maximizes the ability of a 
company to comprise a board with directors having the full range of talents the company’s 
business needs, because directors can be seated and given roles that make sense for them, and 
they are not required to pretend to a specialized expertise they do not truly have.   
This topic is an urgent one now as corporations grapple with where to situate EESG.  To 
date, there has been a noticeable trend toward entrusting the nominating and corporate 
governance committee with responsibility for approving and overseeing the implementation of 
the company’s EESG policies and standards monitoring.85  Rather than integrate EESG into the 
                                                 
84 See SpencerStuart, U.S. Spencer Stuart Board Index 15 (2019), https://www.spencerstuart.com/-/media/2019/ssbi-
2019/us_board_index_2019.pdf (“85% of all S&P 500 board directors are independent . . . .  Boards average 9.1 
independent directors and 1.6 affiliated directors.”). 
85 NACB Public Company Governance Survey 2019-2020, at 27, https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2020/01/2019-2020-Public-Company-Survey.pdf (reporting that 30% of boards locate ESG 
responsibilities in the nominating and governance committee, compared to just 5% that locate those responsibilities 
in the audit committee, although 55% of boards still locate ESG responsibilities at the full board level).   
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corporation’s compliance oversight process, most companies seem to be keeping primary 
responsibility for compliance in the audit committee, while putting EESG in another committee 
or contending the whole board is on point on those issues, and therefore bifurcating, trifurcating, 
or otherwise splitting up what ought to be one integrated approach to inextricably linked goals.  
For the reasons we have discussed, this is wasteful, risks missing key issues of concern, and will 
likely be less effective in creating an ethical and socially responsible corporate culture.   
To more effectively and efficiently organize the compliance and EESG function of the 
corporation, the board should integrate them and allocate responsibility to committees in a 
functionally sensible way.  This allocation of responsibilities would track the skills needed to do 
the task well and mirror the way the task is allocated at the management level.  A sensible 
committee structure will not put all the weight on the audit committee for the most intensive 
tasks, and it should not prevent key officers standing in line behind the CFO from getting time 
with a board committee.   
Rather, the board’s committee structure should be informed by the process outlined, and 
when the fundamental compliance and EESG concerns are lined up and integrated, committees 
should be formed correspondingly based on board member expertise and functional purpose.  For 
most companies,86 this will necessitate creating at least one committee that has a critical risk 
management, compliance, and EESG function addressing some critical non-financial areas of 
concern, such as environment for an energy company or product safety for a pharmaceutical or 
                                                 
86 Some companies have already understood the diversity of compliance and EESG issues they confront and have 
commendably created specific committees that give important elements of non-financial compliance oversight to 
them.  For example, the board of Ashland Global—a leading chemicals company—has established an 
Environmental, Health, Safety and Quality Committee.  Ashland Global Holdings Inc., Proxy Statement (Schedule 
14A) (December 9, 2019), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1674862/000119312519308787/d785067ddef14a.htm.  Likewise, 
Citigroup has established an Ethics, Conduct and Culture Committee.  Citigroup Inc., Proxy Statement (Schedule 
14A) (Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/831001/000120677420000777/citi3648191-
def14a.htm. 
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food company.87  This allocation could also come with responsibility for attendant areas of 
concern, such as a concern for cybersecurity and appropriate regard for consumer privacy as to 
companies that collect sensitive information from their customers.  Establishing such a 
committee would help directors to satisfy both their legal obligations under Caremark88 and the 
nonlegal need to address EESG concerns.89 
But in general it is, of course, important not to proliferate committees, and that is not 
what we are calling for.  Rather, in addition to considering whether to establish a dedicated 
compliance/EESG committee, what also needs to be rethought is the function of some of the 
mandated committees, such as the compensation committee.  By way of illustration, consider the 
areas of compliance that involve issues like worker safety, a discrimination free and tolerant 
workplace, and fair and equitable pay and benefits.  Since they first emerged in American 
corporate governance, compensation committees have focused obsessively on the compensation 
                                                 
87 One size does not always fit all in corporate governance, though do not view standardization with the same degree 
of skepticism that some do.  Leo E. Strine, Jr. & J. Travis Laster, The Siren Song of Unlimited Contractual Freedom, 
in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PARTNERSHIPS, LLCS AND ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 11, 18 
(Robert W. Hillman & Mark J. Lowenstein eds., 2015) (observing that unlimited contractual freedom can impose 
transaction costs due to the need for investors to evaluate unfamiliar terms in LLC and other alternative-entity 
governing documents); Reilly S. Steel, Proxy Access and Optimal Standardization in Corporate Governance: An 
Empirical Analysis, 23 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 173 (2017) (developing a theory in which investors prefer 
standardized terms and presenting empirical evidence consistent with that theory).  It may be that there are some 
companies whose risk management, compliance, and EESG issues are so confined in scope that they can all be 
trusted to the audit committee on top of that committees’ already challenging duties.  We do not think many exist.   
88 See Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 809, 813, 817, 822 (Del. 2019) (mentioning on four separate occasions 
the company’s lack of any committee on the board charged with addressing food safety even though the company’s 
only product was ice cream). 
89 These nonlegal concerns may include a genuine desire on the part of directors to address EESG concerns (or 
satisfy investors’ demands that they do so), or more cynically, merely “signaling” a commitment to EESG.  See 
generally Brian L. Connelly et al., Signaling Theory: A Review and Assessment, 37 J. Mgmt. 39 (2011) (reviewing 
the literature on signaling).  This raises interesting questions about whether signaling concerns might lead some 
boards to pursue EESG approaches that privilege visibility over efficiency.  See, e.g., Aneesh Raghunandan & Shiva 
Rajgopal, Do the Socially Responsible Walk the Talk? Working Paper, 
https://www.bus.miami.edu/_assets/pdfs/thought-leadership/academic-
departments/accounting/seminars/raghunandan-rajgopal-.pdf (finding that, relative to industry peers, signatories of 
the Business Roundtable’s new Statement of Corporate Purpose had higher rates of environmental and labor 
complaints and spent more money on lobbying).  We leave this question to future research, noting only that boards 
may wish to adopt our proposed approach for either efficiency or signaling reasons.  By consolidating EESG and 
compliance functions, our proposal serves the interests of efficiency; at the same time establishing visible 
committees dedicated to both EESG and compliance may signal the board’s commitment to EESG. 
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of top management and making sure that managers’ compensation is linked to gains for 
stockholders.  They have not been focused on the company’s overall human capital strategy, 
considering whether it would create more value to focus more on good pay for the many who toil 
for the company rather than the few at the top, or in overseeing the company’s policies for 
ensuring a safe workplace, diversity, training, and fair pay and benefits for company workers, 
and standards required of company contractors in those are essential to workers.  But, there is an 
increased demand for corporations to give greater consideration to these areas, as exemplified by 
the U.K.’s new requirement for companies to have a director elected by the workforce or a board 
committee that focuses on the workforce’s best interests.90  And bills in Congress show a 
growing interest in having worker representatives on boards,91 an interest that may well result in 
focus on a workforce board committee as a solution that will have more support in the American 
corporate governance context.  With these growing demands, boards and management will have 
to grapple with how to efficiently respond and whether to add a new committee, with the costs 
that it entails in the potential need to increase board size, the length of board members’ and 
managers’ time, and the splitting of related functions.  One potentially effective answer would be 
to reconceive the role of the compensation committee to broaden its mandate to take on oversight 
responsibility for all important workforce issues.  This could give directors an efficient way to 
oversee all key human resources policies, such as those critical to racial and gender pay equity 
and diversity, and also to establish the optimal approach to fair gainsharing between the 
                                                 
90 The UK Corporate Governance Code (July 2018), https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/88bd8c45-50ea-4841-
95b0-d2f4f48069a2/2018-UK-Corporate-Governance-Code-FINAL.pdf (“For engagement with the workforce, one 
or a combination of the following methods should be used [1] a director appointed from the workforce; [2] a formal 
workforce advisory panel; [or 3] a designated non-executive director”). 
91 See sources cited supra note [●]. 
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company’s workforce overall, on the one hand, and its stockholders and top management, on the 
other.92 
In thinking about the committee structure, skeptics might contend that it is essential that 
the entire board be involved in compliance, risk management, and EESG.  And the answer to that 
is:  yes, we agree.  But we recognize that for the entire board to do its collective job well, there is 
an advantage to specialization and time on task, where you use the diverse talents of the board 
and management effectively to make sure that we identify all key issues, give each of them 
adequate time, and are therefore better able to develop and implement an overall approach that is 
most effective.  For example, it could make sense for a board committee to have penultimate 
responsibility for approving the overall compliance/risk management/EESG plan before it goes 
to the board.  That process of approval could involve presentations by other committees about 
key areas of concern.  And likewise, if audit is the approving committee, it could require the 
audit committee and relevant officers to brief the other directors about their approach to financial 
risk and EESG subjects in that area.  Cross-fertilization by a set of strong committees well 
populated with relevant expertise and with the time to do the job well sets up the whole board to 
function much better than loading too much on to the audit committee (the traditional approach) 
                                                 
92 In a related paper, two of us explain how this might work.  Leo E. Strine & Kirby M. Smith, Toward Fair 
Gainsharing and a Quality Workplace for Employees: How a Reconceived Compensation Committee Might Help 
Make Corporations More Responsible Employers and Restore Faith in American Capitalism (Working Paper, June 
16, 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3619273.  Other learned commentators find this 
avenue promising.  See Amelia Miazad, Sex, Power, and Corporate Governance (Forthcoming UC Davis Law 
Review 2020) (discussing the board’s influence on culture and pointing to the compensation committee as a 
committee that increasingly has oversight for culture and workforce issues generally).  And some companies have 
already done this.  See Steve Van Putten, David Bixby & Jan Koors, The Compensation Committee Agenda for 
2019, Harv. Law Sch. Forum on Corporate Governance (May 1, 2019), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/05/01/the-compensation-committee-agenda-for-2019/ (“Broader-based pay 
issues (think CEO Pay Ratio and gender and other diversity-based pay inequities), talent development, and culture-
related concerns are pushing the boundaries of traditional compensation committee responsibilities.”). 
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or setting up a bifurcated process whereby audit does compliance and risk management, and the 
nominating and corporate governance committee is given some vague mandate to oversee EESG.   
To the extent that establishing processes to consider EESG and compliance together has 
the potential to make EESG more durable, this should also appeal to those who advocate EESG 
as a means of redressing social inequities and other shortcomings of our legal and political 
system.  It seems plausible that setting a routinized process for considering EESG together with 
compliance will more firmly embed EESG within corporate culture and governance.93  If so, that 
would be a victory for EESG advocates concerned that EESG may take a back seat if it becomes 
less fashionable with the Davos crowd. 
Conclusion 
With careful thought, corporate leaders can position their companies to better identify 
and address known and emerging risks; adopt goals for responsible corporate behavior toward 
workers, other stakeholders, and society; and establish standards and policies designed to 
promote and measure the attainment of both EESG goals and legal compliance.  This will not be 
easy, but it is an exercise that is long overdue for most companies and will have long-lasting 
value if it becomes not just a one-off restructuring, but a regular process of serious thought about 
how the company makes money and how it affects the world in doing so.  This thought process 
could result in more informed business decisions, a more efficient use of the human capital of the 
board, management and the overall workforce, and best assure a corporate culture that seeks 
sustainable profit by a commitment to being good citizens.  Put plainly, a well-thought-out 
corporate strategy to be an exemplary citizen in all the areas where the company has a material 
                                                 
93 Cf. Donald C. Langevoort, Cultures of Compliance, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 933 (2017) (exploring the role of 
culture in ensuring good compliance) 
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impact on its stakeholders and society should at the very least result in the corporation 
establishing a solid reputation as a law-abiding citizen.  And that in itself is a good thing.   
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